Understaffed and Underfunded: Barriers to Effective Anti-Poverty Assistance

This report was produced in partnership with Communication Workers of America.


Introduction

Workers at county social service agencies across New Jersey provide essential support to our families, friends, and neighbors. They help elders struggling with dementia navigate the process of applying for Medicaid, support veterans in need, and work tirelessly to ensure that hungry children are fed, clothed, and cared for. From Newark to Warren County, social service workers uphold the value of service and care that is the backbone of our shared humanity. Our communities thrive when social service agencies are adequately supported, yet chronic understaffing and underfunding hinder the stability these agencies provide. Low pay and high turnover harm not only the dedicated employees who serve our counties and state but also ripple outward, disrupting vital safety net programs and benefits on which countless individuals and families rely. State leaders often tout these programs as advantages of living in New Jersey, but poor implementation means that residents aren’t getting the help they need.

A new survey conducted by the Communications Workers of America (CWA) of its members working in New Jersey county social service agencies finds that declining staffing and increasing caseloads impact their ability to assist New Jersey residents. Across the county agencies surveyed:

  • Staffing levels from 2019 to 2023 decreased 3.2 percent while caseloads increased 32.4 percent;
  • Nearly three-quarters of respondents in the survey reported that understaffing prevents families from receiving benefits in a timely manner;
  • A majority of respondents cited low pay as a primary driver of understaffing.

 

These results demonstrate the importance of ensuring employees can deliver quality service so residents can access these vital state programs. By increasing pay, setting and enforcing minimum staffing requirements, and providing benefits that improve work-life balance for agency workers, county leaders can better serve their communities.

Thousands in New Jersey Rely on County Agencies for Assistance

Federal and state benefit programs go through administrative processes to reach eligible participants. County social service agencies and the workers that run them are the community connection administering these programs. These workers evaluate applications and provide eligible residents with the services of New Jersey’s public assistance programs, including:

  • Work First New Jersey (WFNJ) (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF], General Assistance [GA], and Emergency Assistance [EA])
  • Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP]
  • NJ FamilyCare (New Jersey’s Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program)
  • Child support services
  • Other assistance programs for the elderly, residents living with disabilities, and more.[i]

 

With nearly 31,000 people currently served by the WFNJ/TANF program, over 830,000 residents currently served by the SNAP program, and over 1.8 million participants in NJ FamilyCare, the county social service agencies are responsible for assisting hundreds of thousands of families each month.[ii]

County Social Service Agencies Assist Hundreds of Thousands of Residents Each Year

There must be enough staff at county social service agencies to serve all eligible residents, regardless of differences across program rules. For example, with its more generous eligibility standards, the SNAP program helps a large number of residents in comparison to the number of residents living in poverty in many counties. Serving eligible residents with timely responses and support to get them the nutrition they need requires a high level of staff capacity.

Insufficient staff capacity combined with problematic program requirements results in fewer residents in need seeking and receiving assistance. The TANF program faces this challenge regularly. With its stringent eligibility requirements that have not changed significantly since the 1990s, TANF becomes more outdated each year and helps fewer and fewer residents in poverty.[iii] These requirements, in combination with low benefits relative to the cost of living, can make eligible residents hesitant to apply. When there are not enough staff to process applications on a timely basis, answer questions, and support those seeking help, the already-existing problems with access to these programs become further exacerbated.

To counteract affordability challenges and more effectively help the nearly 880,000 residents living in poverty, New Jersey leaders must take a two-pronged approach: update program requirements and benefits policies and increase pay and benefits for social service workers, a key step in addressing staffing shortages. 

Undervaluing Workers Delays and Denies Benefit Access

Understanding the working conditions for county social service agencies can help leaders identify how to improve assistance in the state’s anti-poverty programs. A 2024 survey distributed to the 3,000 CWA members employed at county social service agencies across New Jersey examined the connection between staffing levels, workloads, and benefit distribution.[iv] This survey, in combination with data gathered from the Open Public Records Act, requests on staffing and pay levels, highlights the critical role of workers at county agencies in supporting the state’s lowest-income families.

Turnover and Slow Hiring Leaves County Agencies with Low Staffing Levels

When social service agencies are short-staffed, workers are often overwhelmed by the volume of applications and the processing time needed to help all eligible residents.

Despite the increasing need for assistance amongst Garden State residents, staffing levels at county agencies in New Jersey have fallen, putting more strain on workers. Currently, an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 people work for county social service agencies across the state, but these numbers are declining.[v] Across nine agencies (Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cumberland, Hunterdon, Middlesex, Morris, Union, and Warren) that provided current and historical employment data through open records requests,  the number of staff fell 3.2 percent between 2019 and 2023, from 2,268 to 2,195.[vi] At the same time, the number of WFNJ/TANF, SNAP, and NJ FamilyCare evaluations for which those workers were responsible increased by 32.4 percent, from 877,970 in 2019 to 1,162,209 in 2023.[vii] As caseloads per employee rise, turnover can accelerate, and hiring can become more difficult, especially when salaries and benefits do not rise to match the value of each employee’s work.

Staffing Levels Have Fallen, Despite More Residents Seeking Asistance
Source: CWA analysis of 2023 employee census documents retrieved via Open Public Records Act requests. NJPP Analysis of New Jersey Department of Human Services – Division of Family Development, DFD Current Program Statistics, July 2019 and July 2023; New Jersey Department of Human Services – Division of Medical Assistance & Health Services, NJ FamilyCare Monthly Enrollment Statistics, July 2019 and July 2023.

Increases in Benefit Caseload Per Employee Outpace Staffing Needs Across the State

This issue is not contained in a particular county or region. From Atlantic County to Morris County, agencies have failed to maintain sufficient staffing levels. The nine-county average of WFNJ/TANF, SNAP, and NJ FamilyCare evaluations completed by each employee went from 387 in 2019 to 529 in 2023, a 28 percent increase.[viii] Because of similar trends in poverty and budget issues, this pattern likely carries across most of the state.

Fewer employees, each with more cases assigned, means that each employee has less time to help each person and, in some instances, becomes significantly delayed. Complex application and documentation processes and less time available to help those in need increases the likelihood that residents are wrongly turned away or denied benefits. 

Low Pay and Poor Work Environments Lead to Understaffing

“The expense of everyday living does not equate to my paycheck. I am robbing Peter to pay Paul. Due to the lack of pay and increase in health insurance.” – Essex County social service worker

Where workers are undervalued, maintaining adequate staffing levels becomes impossible. Low wages that do not keep pace with the cost of living mean that employees struggle to pay bills and support their families. This makes recruiting larger numbers of staff more difficult. When asked to identify the top two causes of understaffing at their agencies, over half of survey responses received in New Jersey emphasized low pay.

Workers Cite Low Pay as the Leading Cause of Understaffing

In addition to low pay, several other issues — such as a lack of empowerment to provide input in the policies and decision-making, unhealthy workplace climates, and unequal pay across workers with the same title — were all mentioned by nearly 1 in 4 respondents. Additionally, issues such as expensive or inadequate health insurance are closely tied to low pay. Follow-up survey responses emphasized that the combination of low pay and expensive health coverage go hand-in-hand.[ix]

"Our pay is not even close to keeping up with the cost of living increases. The healthcare increases are extreme. I shouldn't be on the verge of homelessness, when trying to serve the homeless, myself." - Camden County Social Service Worker

Deteriorating understaffing issues mean that workloads continuously increase beyond the staff’s capacity. As a result, they experience low morale and burnout much sooner, leading to high turnover rates and difficulty in hiring new staff. This further worsens the understaffing crisis, creating a snowball effect on the agencies’ capabilities to carry out their work successfully. As one Camden County employee shared: “We are being unfairly overworked/understaffed while constantly being told that we need to get things done on time. All while not having a decent raise, which puts morale at an all-time low. Some of us need to miss work due to mental stress alone, which then hurts clients. We need action soon or I don’t see anything getting better.”

Understaffing Leads to Increased Workloads, Low Morale, and Other Negative Outcomes

Only by increasing pay to meet the cost of living and improving work environments can county social service agencies better attract and retain employees to meet staffing needs.

Lack of Sufficient Staffing Delays and Denies Residents Assistance

“The workload has increased tremendously and the loss of staff has gotten worse. There is no time to do all that is required, and if you are not donating your time without compensation, then you can’t keep up.” – Middlesex County Social Service Worker

As workers are saddled with larger workloads, they struggle to meet the timelines necessary to get people the benefits they need. Nearly three-quarters of respondents in the survey cited the inability to provide benefits for families promptly as the main consequence of their agency’s understaffing.

As a Result of Understaffing, Workers are Unable to Provide Promised Benefits to Residents Efficiently

"Applications are 6+ months old. People aren't getting timely services. Elderly and sick people can't go to the doctor because we don't hire enough people." - Monmouth County Social Service Worker

When agencies providing critical support services are short-staffed, the quality of relationships and support for residents also suffers. This is particularly important in social services, as many clients are undergoing vulnerable and difficult experiences. A Camden County employee lamented: “It’s been quantity over quality for as long as I can remember. The “case bank” has stripped the customer of their caseworker, and for some, the caseworker was a relied-on individual in a time of need, who was familiar with their struggle(s). There is no personalization anymore.”

In addition to the inability to provide benefits in a timely manner, nearly one-third of workers also stated that those residents who primarily speak a language other than English do not have the support they need because of the lack of capacity. “In my building, there is only one bilingual worker. Oftentimes, the receptionist is left struggling to communicate with Spanish speaking clients and to find someone to serve them,” wrote a clerk in Ocean County. “The lack of bilingual workers leaves critical communication needs unmet, especially in field duties such as home visits and client interviews,” noted another worker from Ocean County.

With hundreds of thousands of residents across diverse communities in need of assistance, barriers to social service programs can prevent families from escaping poverty and worsen economic, health, and racial inequities. If New Jersey truly wants to be a leading state in providing generous benefits for residents and a political and economic environment where all residents can thrive, state leaders need to focus on improving the implementation of existing programs, as well as creating new programs and services. Increased benefits will not reach families in need without adequate delivery of services.

Policy Recommendations

While this report identifies challenging issues in New Jersey’s county social service agencies, recent and ongoing collective bargaining processes at the local level offer opportunities to make significant improvements. New Jersey’s public sector bargaining framework allows employees with expertise on the conditions on the ground to negotiate with their employer to improve working conditions, staffing levels, and the quality of work and service across the board. Recent examples from localities such as Ocean County — which has seen increased staffing, decreased turnover, and improved workloads after pay increases — provide a foundation for progress.[x]

In 2024 and 2025, the majority of social service agencies and their unions across the state are either scheduled to start bargaining or are currently engaged in ongoing negotiations.[xi] Through these collective bargaining processes and broader policy changes, Garden State decision-makers and workers must urgently come together to implement three main recommendations from this report’s findings.

Increase Pay

Over 86 percent of survey respondents who said they were considering leaving the job stated that a pay increase of at least 10 percent would help to convince them to stay at their job.[xii] Several respondents reported that more than 10 percent would be needed, particularly with concerns about the increased cost of living and health insurance.[xiii] By increasing pay to meet the cost of living, county social service agencies can improve working conditions for employees and attract more residents to agency jobs.

Improve and Enforce Staffing Ratios

Nearly half (48 percent) of survey respondents reported that a fully staffed department would help convince them to stay at their job.[xiv] Requiring stronger staff-to-program beneficiary ratios and enforcing those ratios would help ensure that the county social service agencies can adequately perform their jobs.

Improve Work-Life Balance for Workers

While the staffing ratios and higher pay will help, improving or providing other benefits — such as child care support, greater flexibility for attending doctor appointments during work hours, and increasing the number of vacation and sick days — will further improve work-life balance to retain workers and attract more to the agencies.

Appendix A: Survey Research Methods

Over 3,000 employees at 14 county social service agencies are represented by the Communications Workers of America (CWA), working under collective bargaining agreements. Social service agency employees represented by CWA coordinate statewide through the CWA New Jersey Welfare Council (Welfare Council). In the spring of 2023, the Welfare Council designed and distributed a survey to measure worker concerns about staffing levels, pay, benefits, and service provision across the state. Between May and August 2024, the survey was sent to all CWA members at 11 of the 21 social service agencies, and 592 employees completed the survey.

Survey outreach was designed to capture a diverse sample of social service agency workers, including employees with a range of job titles and demographic backgrounds, and who work at a mix of large, medium, and small agencies in urban and rural contexts. In addition to surveys, semi-structured interviews with three workers from each agency were conducted to understand quantitative and qualitative survey data better.

Survey participants are racially and ethnically diverse. Of the 492 who answered questions about race and ethnicity (83 percent of the total), 48 percent are White, 33 percent are Black or African American, 9 percent are Multiracial, and 5 percent are Hispanic. Five hundred (84 percent) respondents answered the question about gender: 82 percent are women, and 18 percent are men, reflecting the gender demographics in the social service sector as a whole. For a more detailed chart of survey responses by agency, job title, race/ethnicity, and gender, please contact CWA.

Survey Questions:

  1. Which County Welfare Agency do you work for?
  2. Which programs do you work on (select all that apply)?
  3. Title
  4. If you selected “other” for title above, please share your job title.
  5. Years of Service
  6. Are you a full-time or a part-time employee?
  7. What issues are you the most concerned about in your workplace? Please select the top 3.
  8. Please rate your level of agreement with the following statement: “My department is currently understaffed.”
  9. How long ago did understaffing start?
  10. What do you believe are the two (2) primary drivers of understaffing in your department? Please select only the top 2.
  11. Please rate your level of agreement with the following statement: “My workload interferes with my work/life balance.”
  12. How long ago did your workload get so high that it began to interfere with your work/life balance?
  13. Have you experienced any of the following outcomes as a result of understaffing (select all that apply)?
  14. Has understaffing impacted your department’s ability to provide quality services?
  15. Has understaffing affected the quality of services in your department in any of the following ways?
  16. Please provide specific examples as to how understaffing has impacted the quality of services you are able to provide to the clients.
  17. In the past year, have you considered leaving your job for reasons other than retirement?
  18. What are the top 2 concerns affecting your consideration to leave?
  19. If you are still considering leaving your position, would any of the following convince you to stay?
  20. What is your race?
  21. What is your ethnicity?
  22. What is your gender?

End Notes

[i] New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, County Social Service Agencies, 2024. https://www.nj.gov/humanservices/dfd/counties/

[ii] Note: Throughout the report, “WFNJ/TANF” refers to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program under the umbrella of Work First New Jersey, in order to differentiate it from the numbers for General Assistance or Emergency Assistance under Work First New Jersey. Numbers from: NJPP Analysis of New Jersey Department of Human Services – Division of Family Development, DFD Current Program Statistics, September 2024. https://nj.gov/humanservices/dfd/news/cps.html

[iii] New Jersey Policy Perspective, Outdated and Ineffective: Why New Jersey Needs to Update Its Top Anti-Poverty Program, 2024. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/outdated-and-ineffective-why-new-jersey-needs-to-update-its-top-anti-poverty-program/; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 2022. https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/policy-basics-an-introduction-to-tanf; New Jersey Policy Perspective, Promoting Equal Opportunities for Children Living in Poverty, 2020. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/promoting-equal-opportunities-for-children-living-in-poverty/

[iv] For detailed research methods and information about the demographics of the survey respondents, please see Appendix A.

[v] The total social service employment estimate is based on CWA analysis of the following: (1) 2023 total employment data provided by 16 of the 21 social service agencies in response to OPRA requests in 2023, and (2) For the missing 5 counties: estimates were established based on average 2023 employment at agencies with similar poverty rates/benefit participation rates.

[vi] In 2023, the Communications Workers of America obtained employee census snapshots pulled on June 30th, 2019 and June 30th, 2023 via public records requests from nine New Jersey county social service agencies. Records were obtained from Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cumberland, Hunterdon, Middlesex, Morris, Union, and Warren Counties. Collectively, these nine counties supported a third of the total people receiving benefits from WFNJ/TANF, SNAP, and NJ FamilyCare in New Jersey in 2019 and 2023.

[vii] NJPP Analysis of New Jersey Department of Human Services – Division of Family Development, DFD Current Program Statistics, July 2019 and July 2023. https://nj.gov/humanservices/dfd/news/cps.html

[viii] Lists of current vacancies by agency were also obtained through OPRA in 2023. Vacancy data suggest that even in the counties where short staffing is not as severe, there are persistent challenges filling vacancies.

[ix] NJPP Analysis of CWA survey data. Data on file with CWA and the author.

[x] CWA Local 1088, representing employees at the Ocean County Social Services Board, worked productively with management to negotiate a historic contract in 2024. The contract was ratified in June of 2024 and, among other improvements, it increased starting pay across all job titles by $3 an hour. Between June and November, at least 60 new employees have been hired, turnover has decreased, and workloads are improving. The contract also includes provisions for an additional $2/hour increase to starting pay by 2025. This progress in Ocean points to the importance of increasing pay and including the people who do the work in robust negotiations to improve New Jersey’s social service landscape. Source: Interview with Steven P. Hernandez, Ocean County Social Services Board, Chapter VP, CWA Local 1088, November 2024.

[xi] NJPP review of social service agency collective bargaining agreements and expiration dates available publicly or by request. Note: public sector bargaining agreements in NJ are collected by and made publicly available by Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC): https://www.nj.gov/perc/conciliation/contracts/

[xii] NJPP Analysis of CWA survey data. Data on file with CWA and the author.

[xiii] NJPP Analysis of CWA survey data. Data on file with CWA and the author.

[xiv] NJPP Analysis of CWA survey data. Data on file with CWA and the author.

Fair and Square: Changing New Jersey’s Tax Code to Promote Equity and Fiscal Responsibility

New Jersey is a rich state with high median wages, high concentrations of wealth, and high productivity.[i] But that wealth does not translate into prosperity for all — more than 1 in 8 children live in poverty,[ii] and key public investments, including schools, public transportation, and municipal services, have faced decades of underfunding and underinvestment. The top 1 percent of households by income take home more than 24 times more than the bottom 99 percent.[iii] Meanwhile, economic growth is increasingly concentrated in multinational corporate profits instead of workers, deepening a system of haves and have-nots.[iv] This inequality exacerbates racial economic divides, with Black and Hispanic/Latinx workers paid lower wages and holding less wealth than white households.[v]

New Jersey can counter these trends, sustain public investments, and reduce income concentration in wealthy households and corporations, by strengthening its progressive tax system. In this system, wealthier individuals pay a higher tax rate, while those with lower incomes pay less.[vi] This approach reflects societal values that those who have benefited the most from our economic systems should contribute a higher percentage of their income and pay back their fair share to the rest of the state, while those with fewer financial resources should pay a smaller share.

Now is the moment to address tax fairness, as more revenue will be needed to improve affordability for the state’s residents. Unfortunately, the state’s revenues have not kept pace with existing obligations, in part because of years of underinvestment in pensions, deferred maintenance on New Jersey Transit,[vii] and failure to fully fund the school funding formula.[viii] These choices led to irresponsible budgeting, which mortgaged the state’s future for short-term budget patches.[ix] As a result, the state is now running a structural deficit, meaning it collects less in revenue than it spends on programs and services.[x] As these longer-term fiscal projections from an independent group of New Jersey budget experts show in the graph below, this deficit will expand in the years to come, draining the state’s surplus and hampering new investments.[xi]

New Jersey's State Budget is Projected to Bring in Billions Less in Revenue to Sustain Current Public Services and Programs

New Jersey’s need for tax reform has additional urgency because of looming threats to the national landscape. Federal tax law changes from 2017 gave substantial tax cuts to wealthy individuals and corporations starting in 2019, but those changes may become permanent in 2025 when those provisions expire.[xii] Expiring federal funds from pandemic-era aid for states will create fiscal cliffs for critical programs such as New Jersey Transit, which has already led to fare increases and the end of popular fare programs.[xiii] The state’s economy needs increased investment in public services at exactly the time when federal support for progressive tax policy and aid to states is declining.

To meet these policy goals, this report lays out a range of revenue-raising options that meet key criteria:

  • Raise new revenues for the state
  • Are based on former or current tax systems such as gross income, sales, or corporate taxation
  • Increase the overall progressivity of the state’s tax system
  • Improve racial and economic equity by closing existing income and wealth disparities.

 

The full package of revenue increases outlined in this report would raise nearly $4 billion annually for the state’s budget — enough to make all school meals free, restore state aid to schools getting cuts, and cover the state’s entire deficit. The full package includes the state’s major revenue streams, including gross income, sales, corporate business, and inherited wealth taxes, identifying targeted changes to generate much-needed funding without placing those costs disproportionately on the people who need the most help:

  • Income tax: Revising the income tax to add brackets for higher-income residents, including new rates on earners over $2 million, $5 million, and $10 million in income, while expanding working-family tax credits such as the Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit to ensure that low- and moderate-income households benefit from the tax changes.
  • Inherited wealth tax: Reforming inherited wealth taxes to reduce unearned wealth transfers and tax large inheritances.
  • Sales tax: Restoring the sales tax to 7 percent, along with modernizing services exemptions, which have excluded accounting, advertising, engineering, and other high-end services from taxation.
  • Realty transfer fee: Adding two percentage points to the existing 1 percent realty transfer fee on home sales over $1 million and four percentage points on sales over $2 million.
  • Corporate tax: Requiring large multinational corporations to report profits from overseas subsidiaries, forcing them to stop offshore profit-shifting.

 

Net Effect of Tax Policy Changes Would Result in Nearly $4 Billion in New Revenue Annually Right-Size the Income Tax: Raise Rates at the Top, Lower Them at the Bottom

Proposal Overview

Making New Jersey’s income tax more progressive would increase revenue and improve affordability for working- and middle-class households. This proposal would add new tax brackets for incomes over $2 million, $5 million, and $10 million, affecting only a tiny fraction of taxpayers but targeting a significant portion of the state’s wealth. Additionally, it would expand the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to 50 percent of the federal credit and make all workers who file taxes eligible to claim it. The Child Tax Credit (CTC) would also be expanded to $1,500, extending eligibility to children up to age 11. While the expanded working-family tax credits would reduce overall revenues, they would reduce income inequality and provide more financial support to low- and moderate-income households. Combined, this proposal would generate about $772 million annually.[xiv]

Raise Rates at the Top: Higher Marginal Income Tax Rates for High Earners

 New Jersey’s gross income tax applies different rates to income brackets, starting at 1.4 percent for the first $20,000 and reaching 10.75 percent for income over $1 million. This tax funds the state’s local property tax relief and serves as the primary revenue source for school aid.[xv] Even with these progressive elements, wealth continues to remain heavily concentrated in high-income households, with the top 20 percent of households taking home more than half the state’s total income.[xvi]

As shown in the table below, the proposal introduces new tax brackets at $2 million, $5 million, and $10 million, in addition to the existing 10.75 percent rate on earnings over $1 million, known as the “Millionaires Tax.” This adjustment alone would raise more than $1.2 billion for essential state programs while affecting less than 1 percent of households.[xvii] As wealth continues to concentrate at the top, a fair tax system should impose higher rates on the highest earners.

Proposed Tax Rates Would Increase Rates on Only the Top 1% of Incomes

As the state’s experience with the millionaires tax has shown, gross income tax receipts continue to climb despite the increasing marginal rates for those earning over $1 million and $5 million income.[xviii] Additionally, research shows that raising income tax rates on high earners has minimal impact on economic growth.[xix] High-income residents continue to call New Jersey home, and the number of tax filers with over $1 million in income increased by nearly 50 percent between 2019 and 2021.[xx]

Lower Rates at the Bottom: Expanding Working Family Tax Credits

New Jersey, like many states, uses its tax code to reduce poverty and improve affordability to working families and households to help them meet the cost of living by putting cash directly into their bank accounts to help cover the cost of living in the state.[xxi] In particular, the state funds two major tax credits that reduce poverty statewide: the state Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)[xxii] and the state Child Tax Credit (CTC).[xxiii] As the name implies, the EITC pays workers back by enhancing their incomes, while the CTC provides cash rebates to families with children under age 6. The success of the federal Child Tax Credit has shown that even modest increases in credit amounts can dramatically reduce child poverty.[xxiv]

However, in New Jersey, both programs are still limited in their eligibility, weakening their antipoverty effects. The EITC, for example, is not available for workers without a Social Security number, excluding immigrant workers who pay and file taxes each year.[xxv] The CTC is only available for families with a child under age 6,[xxvi] despite research showing that children’s expenses grow as they age.[xxvii]

New Jersey should expand its Earned Income Tax Credit to 50 percent of the federal credit, and expand eligibility to all workers who file taxes, not just those with Social Security numbers.

Similarly, New Jersey should expand its Child Tax Credit to children ages 6 to 11 and increase the maximum benefit from $1,000 to $1,500 for children under age 6.[xxviii]

These changes would put hundreds of dollars back into families’ pockets, helping make New Jersey the best place to raise a family. These combined proposals would increase the progressivity of the tax code by providing an estimated $432 million to low- and moderate-income households. By amplifying the antipoverty effects of these critical lifelines, the state can help more households meet basic needs and raise the standard of living for working families. 

Net Effect of Combined Income Tax Proposals

Expanding tax credits for the lowest 40 percent of earners while raising income tax rates for the top 1 percent would make the state’s income tax system more progressive. This would generate additional income for the state while reducing the financial burden on its lowest-income residents, with no changes to rates for the majority of taxpayers.

Lower-Income Groups Would See Benefits While Only Highest 1% Would See Increases

This combination of income tax changes would boost revenue and make the tax system fairer — a win-win for both New Jersey and its residents. The annual increase of $1.2 billion in revenue based on the bracket changes at the top of the income spectrum would be partially offset by the $432 million in reductions for low- and moderate-income households, resulting in a net revenue increase of $772 million. These tax law changes raise costs only for the wealthiest one percent while helping those who need the most help and funding critical state priorities.

Restore Taxes on Inherited Wealth Transfers

Proposal Overview

Taxation of intergenerational wealth is critical to reducing wealth inequality, shrinking the racial wealth gap, and equitably generating revenue. New Jersey currently has an inheritance tax which taxes the money collected by heirs, but the state no longer has an estate tax which taxes the overall value of the deceased person’s estate.[xxix] The proposed options aim to either eliminate inheritance tax exemptions or restore the estate tax, ensuring that intergenerational wealth transfers among the wealthiest households contribute to critical state needs. By implementing these changes, New Jersey could generate between $450 million and $598 million annually.[xxx]

Proposal Details

Currently, the inheritance tax includes major exemptions, covering lineal descendants (children, grandchildren, etc.), spouses, or lineal ancestors (parents, grandparents, etc.).[xxxi] Since the majority of inheritances come from parents or grandparents,[xxxii] these broad exemptions have resulted in most estate wealth being exempt from taxation entirely: Of the nearly $5.8 billion in total estate wealth in 2017, less than $2.5 billion (43 percent) was taxable.[xxxiii]

These loopholes run the risk of worsening wealth disparities and racial wealth inequality. Inheritances disproportionately benefit higher-income people, who compound their existing wealth while lower-income people are unlikely to receive any inheritance at all.[xxxiv] Across races, the difference in inheritance rates reinforce existing disparities: 30 percent of white families nationally report having received an inheritance, compared to only 10 percent of Black and 7 percent of Latinx/Hispanic families.[xxxv]

The Majority of New Jersey Estate Wealth Avoids Taxation Due to Broad Exemptions

Compounding matters, New Jersey eliminated its estate tax for residents passing away after December 31, 2017.[xxxvi] Estate taxes were levied on the total value of the estate of the deceased person, and the elimination of this tax has led to substantial revenue loss for the state, estimated at $560 million in 2022 — $598 million in 2024 dollars.[xxxvii]

Concerns about the potential risks of inherited wealth taxes at the state level, such as forced home sales to cover tax costs or an exodus of older high-wealth residents, do not have a strong basis in the available evidence. Real estate such as homes and land do not make up the bulk of estates, which are overwhelmingly composed of intangible property such as retirement and bank accounts.[xxxviii] Meanwhile, research on aging adults and their moving behavior shows, at most, little effect on residence decisions.[xxxix]

New Jersey has two options for taxing inherited wealth transfers:

  • Eliminating the inheritance tax exemptions and subjecting all transfers to taxation;
  • Restoring the estate tax.

 

Removing inheritance tax exemptions would generate an estimated $451 million in annual revenue for the state[xl]. Restoring the estate tax could generate between $450 million and $598 million annually. These amounts could vary, depending on state policy decisions such as the size of exemptions, whether some heirs would still have partial exemptions, and the interplay between the two taxes. Nonetheless, taxing intergenerational wealth transfers is an effective way to raise revenue while reducing wealth inequality.

Restore the Sales Tax Rate and Eliminate Loopholes and Exemptions

Proposal Overview

Reversing the damaging Christie-era sales tax cut while modernizing the sales tax by eliminating gimmicks and exemptions would create a broader tax base and generate much-needed revenue. Specifically, the proposal aims to: restore the sales tax from 6.625 percent to 7 percent; eliminate loopholes for car rental companies and yacht purchases; and tax high-end professional services. Taken together, this proposal could generate about $859 million.

Restoring the sales tax to 7 percent would generate $702 million annually, while eliminating the car rental and yacht loopholes would add another $157 million. Estimates for eliminating high-end professional services vary due to the complexity of industry-specific sales data.

Proposal Details

Increasing sales taxes can bring in much-needed reliable revenue for a budget facing a structural deficit.[xli] New Jersey’s sales tax supports the state’s general fund by taxing consumer purchases, with exemptions for groceries, medicine, and various services.[xlii] Although the sales tax does place proportionally more financial burden on lower-income residents, the below graph shows that people in the bottom 60 percent of incomes would see increases of under $100 if the sales tax cut were reversed, with even smaller amounts for lower-income residents.

To counter the impact on low- and moderate-income households, New Jersey can maintain and improve its overall progressive tax code by expanding refundable working family tax credits as detailed in the income tax section above.[xliii]

Returning the Sales Tax to 7% Would Cost Most Households Less Than $100 Per Year

Robust sales tax collections are essential for aligning the state’s revenues with state economic activity. However, it is crucial not to compound the sales tax’s regressive nature by allocating the revenue generated on regressive tax programs such as property tax credits.[xliv] Past ill-planned tax cuts, like the Christie-era sales tax reduction, cost the state hundreds of millions in much-needed tax dollars while providing little in terms of economic benefits.[xlv]

Restoring the sales tax to 7 percent would generate roughly $700 million in additional revenue for the state. About one-quarter of the revenue generated — around $180 million — would come from non-residents, such as tourists and shoppers from neighboring states.[xlvi]

Additionally, New Jersey’s sales tax is primarily geared toward goods, even though services now make up a larger portion of the economy as a whole. Services account for nearly two-thirds of all consumer spending in the state,[xlvii] yet high-end services remained exempt. Put differently, when a family goes to buy a computer, they pay taxes on that purchase, but if a large corporation buys computing services from a third-party vendor, they do not pay taxes on that service.

Examples of services exempt from sales tax include:

  • Accounting and Bookkeeping
  • Architects
  • Land Surveying
  • Attorneys
  • Engineers
  • Advertising and Marketing
  • Public Relations and Management Consulting
  • Lobbying and Consulting
  • Data Processing Services

 

These high-end services, categorized under “Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services” in the North American Industry Classification System, generated $67.6 billion in revenue in New Jersey, based on 2017 data,[xlviii] much of which was not subject to sales tax.[xlix]

Major Service Industries Are Not Subject to Sales Tax, Leaving Potentially Billions in Revenue on the Table

Updating the state’s sales tax code to include these services and closing loopholes can bring in substantial revenue. Closing the car rental loophole alone could generate $174 million annually,[l] while repealing the yacht purchase tax would bring in about $15 million in additional annual revenue.[li]

The state has precedent for updating services subject to sales tax, but it has been nearly 20 years since the last major revision in 2006.[lii] That update expanded the tax to include services like pre-written computer software, flooring installation, storage units, and personal care services such as tanning salons and massage therapy.

Raise Fees on Super-Luxury Homes Sales

Proposal Overview

 New Jersey’s market for super-luxury homes continues to grow, as homes with high price tags continue to sell faster than more moderately priced homes.[liii] Currently, New Jersey levies a 1 percent tax on home sales greater than $1 million.[liv] This proposal suggests increasing the tax to 3 percent for homes over $1 million and 5 percent for homes over $2 million. This proposal would generate about $410 million in new annual revenues while affecting only the top 10 percent of home sales.

Proposal Details

The existing fee has done little to dampen the luxury home market, with sales of very expensive homes continuing to grow while the overall housing market has cooled. While many residents struggle with the high cost of housing in New Jersey, very expensive homes continue to change hands at a high rate. However, as detailed in a recent NJPP analysis, an added fee on expensive home sales would provide substantial revenue for the state.[lv] Home sales over $1 million represent less than 10 percent of home sales in the state, with home sales over $2 million making up less than 2 percent.[lvi] These transactions affect high-income or high-wealth households, leaving the vast majority of homeowners unaffected.

Home Sales Over $1 Million Make Up a Small Percentage of Total Home Sales

Require Worldwide Combined Corporate Reporting to Fight Against Profit Offshoring

Proposal Overview

As large multinational corporations have enjoyed the lion’s share of economic growth, they have also grown sophisticated in hiding their profits, shifting to tax haven countries to avoid tax exposure in the United States. As corporations have used sophisticated tax avoidance strategies to move their profits overseas, they have hidden their true profit margins from state regulators.[lvii] Across the country, the overall corporate tax base has shrunk even as corporate profits have skyrocketed to record levels.[lviii] New Jersey can help fight back against this corporate tax offshoring through a straightforward solution: require all corporations to report profits from global subsidiaries, not just those based in the United States. This approach, called “mandatory worldwide combined reporting,” is a critical tool to address profit offshoring, which has accelerated in recent years, significantly reducing the corporate tax base.

Currently, New Jersey taxes corporations that meet a certain threshold of sales in New Jersey by applying a tax to their overall profits, based on the proportion of those sales occurring in the state.[lix] By expanding this to include all global profits, New Jersey would increase its overall tax base, raising an estimated $888 million in annual revenue simply by requiring corporations to disclose all profits, including those declared overseas.

Proposal Details

The concept of requiring full disclosure, called “mandatory worldwide combined reporting,” simplifies the complex web of corporate offshore holdings by requiring that all profits generated by companies controlled by a parent company be included in New Jersey’s corporate tax calculations.[lx] Currently, under “water’s edge reporting,” New Jersey only requires that corporations disclose profits generated by companies in the United States, taxing them based on the portion of sales made within the state.[lxi] But, by shifting profits overseas, many corporations make their biggest profits invisible to the state’s taxing authority.

Mandatory combined reporting would close this loophole and level the playing field, by forcing large multinational corporations to show where their profits are hidden. This would also benefit smaller domestic corporations that lack the resources to establish foreign subsidiaries or operate in foreign tax haven countries.

An estimate from 2019 placed the potential benefit to New Jersey of adopting worldwide combined reporting at $714 million.[lxii] This figure is now projected to be nearly $890 million adjusted for inflation.

Increase State Tax Enforcement Workforce

Proposal Overview

The New Jersey state’s tax division hires auditors and collectors to examine the returns of taxpayers to identify errors and collect assessments. This workforce helps ensure the state maximizes its collections and reduces fraud and errors, particularly among high-income and high-wealth taxpayers. However, the number of auditors has declined since the Great Recession. New Jersey should restore its auditor workforce to pre-Great Recession levels, increasing the number of auditors from 340 to at least 485.[lxiii] This proposal would generate about $385 million annually.

Proposal Details

Over the past 20 years, New Jersey’s auditor workforce has shrunk by 30 percent, even though the complexity of the state’s budget and tax code have grown substantially. This reduction has weakened the state’s ability to combat tax fraud and ensure accuracy, especially for complex tax returns. On average, each New Jersey auditor identifies about $2.35 million in assessments.[lxiv] Restoring the workforce to 485 would yield $341 million in additional annual revenue.[lxv] Reinstating the 20 compliance officers lost since 2004 would add another $44 million, bringing the total potential revenue increase to $385 million.[lxvi] These figures are consistent with past performance when auditor staffing levels were higher, with assessment surpassing $1 billion during from 2007 to 2010 when auditor workforces were at their peak.[lxvii]

The Number of Tax Auditors Has Not Recovered from Christie-Era Cuts

Federal efforts to target high-income individuals and large corporations out of compliance with their tax obligations have yielded substantial collections, with nearly $1 billion in past-due taxes collected.[lxviii] Federal tax authorities have noted that the complexity of higher-income audits and auditor attrition has extended the amount of time needed to complete audits.[lxix]

What’s Next for New Jersey

New Jersey needs a set of new revenue streams that will fund the next generation of programs to improve affordability and induce economic growth for generations to come. Whether that comes in the form of increased investments in housing and infrastructure, substantial expansions of tax credits and cash assistance for working families, or increased support for K-12 and higher education, any expansions in public programs to assist affordability will need funding. However, to fully advance equity and lift up the state’s working-class and middle-class residents, these revenues must be generated progressively, ensuring that the state’s wealthiest residents pay their fair share for prosperity for all.

Broadly, this package of potential revenue raisers would set New Jersey on a path toward fiscal responsibility, generate sufficient funds to invest in growth and affordability, and reduce income and economic inequity. Without bold changes in tax policy, New Jersey runs the risk of falling back into the rut it was in at the end of the Christie administration, with a low credit rating, enormous pension and school funding liabilities, and a budget that slashed state employment and investment.[lxx] The choice is clear: New Jersey can choose prosperity for all through targeted taxation of the very wealthy, or a return to fiscal brinkmanship and the continued deferral of essential investments in the state’s well-being.

Net Effect of Tax Policy Changes Would Result in Nearly $4 Billion in New Revenue Annually


End Notes

[i] New Jersey ranks second in the nation in median income at $99,781. See Katherine Engel and Kirby G. Posey, U.S. Census Bureau, Household Income in States and Metropolitan Areas: 2023, p. 3, tbl. 1 (Sept. 2024), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2024/demo/acsbr-023.pdf. New Jersey ranks in the top ten in median net worth. See U.S. Census Bureau,

Wealth and Asset Ownership for Households, by Type of Asset and States: 2022, table 1,

Survey of Income and Program Participation, Survey Year 2023, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tables/wealth/2022/wealth-asset-ownership/state_wealth_tables_dy2022.xlsx. New Jersey’s gross domestic product ranks tenth nationally. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, SQGDP1 State quarterly gross domestic product (GDP) summary (accessed Wednesday, October 16, 2024), https://apps.bea.gov/itable/index.html?appid=70&stepnum=40&Major_Area=3&State=0&Area=XX&TableId=532&Statistic=3&Year=2024:Q2&YearBegin=-1&Year_End=-1&Unit_Of_Measure=Levels&Rank=1&Drill=1&nRange=5.

[ii] U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce. “Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months.” American Community Survey, ACS 1-Year Estimates Subject Tables, Table S1701, 2023, https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST1Y2023.S1701?q=child poverty&g=040XX00US34. Accessed on October 16, 2024.

[iii] Estelle Sommeiller & Mark Price, Economic Policy Institute, The New Gilded Age: Income Inequality in the U.S. by State, Metropolitan Area, and County at tbl. 1 (July 19, 2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/147963.pdf.

[iv] U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Corporate Profits with Inventory Valuation Adjustment (IVA) and Capital Consumption Adjustment (CCAdj) [CPROFIT], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPROFIT, October 16, 2024. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Compensation of Employees: Wages and Salary Accruals [WASCUR], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WASCUR, . https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=G8JT.

[v] New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, The Two New Jerseys by the Numbers: Racial Wealth Disparities in the Garden State (March 2023), https://njisj.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Two_New_Jerseys_By_the_Numbers_Data_Brief_3.23.23-compressed.pdf.

[vi] By contrast a regressive tax system has higher tax rates for lower-income residents. For more information on progressive and regressive tax systems, see Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States, Seventh Edition (Jan. 2024), https://sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/itep/ITEP-Who-Pays-7th-edition.pdf.

[vii] Alex Ambrose & Peter Chen, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Getting Back on Track: Fully Fund NJ Transit by Taxing Big Corporations, Sept. 27, 2023, https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/getting-back-on-track-fully-fund-nj-transit-by-taxing-big-corporations/.

[viii] For a review on the accumulation of insufficient funding of the school funding formula, see Bruce Baker & Mark Weber, New Jersey Policy Perspective, School Funding in New Jersey: A Fair Future for All, Part 3: The School Funding Reform Act – 2020 Update (Nov. 2020), https://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/NJPP-School-Funding-in-New-Jersey-A-Fair-Future-for-All-Part-3.pdf.

[ix] Gordon MacInnes & Sheila Reynertson, New Jersey Policy Perspective, The Notorious Nine: How Key Decisions Sent New Jersey’s Financial Health Spiraling Down Over Two Decades (Sept. 2016), https://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/NJPPNotorious9Sept2016.pdf.

[x] Multi-Year Budget Workgroup, Steve Sweeney Center for Public Policy, New Jersey’s Fiscal Cliff: Current Services Budget Projections, Long-Term Economic Forecast, and the Multi-Year Structural Deficit (June 13, 2024), https://chss.rowan.edu/centers/sweeney_center/mybwreportjune2024web.pdf.

[xi] Multi-Year Budget Workgroup, Steve Sweeney Center for Public Policy, New Jersey’s Fiscal Cliff: Current Services Budget Projections, Long-Term Economic Forecast, and the Multi-Year Structural Deficit (June 13, 2024), https://chss.rowan.edu/centers/sweeney_center/mybwreportjune2024web.pdf.

[xii] Steve Wamhoff, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Extending Temporary Provisions of the 2017 Trump Tax Law: Updated National and State-by-State Estimates, Sept. 13, 2024, https://itep.org/trump-tax-law-tcja-permanent-state-by-state-estimates/.

[xiii] Nikita Biryukov, NJ Transit approves $3B budget amid outcry over fare hikes, New Jersey Monitor, Jul. 25, 2024, https://newjerseymonitor.com/2024/07/25/nj-transit-approves-3b-budget-amid-outcry-over-fare-hikes/.

[xiv] Based on analysis by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.

[xv] John Reitmeyer, Explainer: A Look Under the Hood of NJ’s Income Tax and Its Special Quirks, NJ Spotlight News, Apr. 9, 2019, https://www.njspotlightnews.org/2019/04/19-04-08-explainer-a-look-under-the-hood-of-njs-income-tax-and-its-special-quirks/.

[xvi] Data shows that the top 5 percent of households by income in New Jersey take home more than 22 percent of the state’s aggregate income. The top 20 percent take home more than 51 percent. B19082 Census 1-year 2023 estimate.

[xvii] Based on analysis by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.

[xviii] U.S. Census Bureau, State Government Tax Collections, Individual Income Taxes in New Jersey [NJINCTAX], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NJINCTAX, October 16, 2024.

[xix] Wesley Tharpe, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Raising State Income Tax Rates at the Top a Sensible Way to Fund Key Investments (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/raising-state-income-tax-rates-at-the-top-a-sensible-way-to-fund-key.

[xx] The number of tax filers with $1 million or more in income increased from 22,720 to 33,770 between 2019 and 2021. Compare Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Table 2: Individual Income and Tax Data, by State and Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2019 (Dec. 2021), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19in31nj.xlsx with Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Table 2: Individual Income and Tax Data, by State and Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2021 (Feb. 2024), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/21in31nj.xlsx.

[xxi] Samantha Waxman et al., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Interactive Map: States Should Continue Enacting and Expanding Child Tax Credits and Earned Income Tax Credits (Aug. 24, 2024), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/states-should-continue-enacting-and-expanding-child-tax-credits-and.

[xxii] New Jersey Division of Taxation, NJ Earned Income Tax Credit Frequently Asked Questions (last updated Dec. 2023), https://www.nj.gov/treasury/taxation/eitc/eitcfaq.shtml

[xxiii] New Jersey Division of Taxation, Child Tax Credit (last updated Jan. 5, 2024), https://www.nj.gov/treasury/taxation/individuals/childtaxcredit.shtml.

[xxiv] Elise Gould, Child Tax Credit expansions were instrumental in reducing poverty rates to historic lows in 2021, Economic Policy Institute Working Economics Blog, Sept. 22, 2022, https://www.epi.org/blog/child-tax-credit-expansions-were-instrumental-in-reducing-poverty-to-historic-lows-in-2021/.

[xxv] Vineeta Kapahi, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Building a More Immigrant Inclusive Tax Code: Expanding the EITC to ITIN Filers (July 2020),

https://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/NJPP-Report-Building-a-More-Immigrant-Inclusive-Tax-Code-Expanding-the-EITC-to-ITIN-Filers-1.pdf. For more on the nearly $100 billion in tax payments by undocumented immigrants including more than $1.3 billion in New Jersey alone, see Carl Davis, Marco Guzman & Emma Sifre, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Tax Payments by Undocumented Immigrants, Jul. 30, 2024, https://sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/itep/ITEP-Tax-Payments-by-Undocumented-Immigrants-2024.pdf.

[xxvi] N.J. Stat. Sec. 54A:4-17.1

[xxvii] Mark Lino et al., U.S. Department of Agriculture, Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion, Expenditures on Children by Families, 2015,. Miscellaneous Publication No. 1528-2015 (Mar. 2017), p. 15, https://fns-prod.azureedge.us/sites/default/files/resource-files/crc2015-march2017.pdf.

[xxviii] For additional information on proposals to expand the state’s Child Tax Credit, see Peter Chen, New Jersey Policy Perspective, How an Expanded Child Tax Credit Would Help More Hard-Working New Jersey Families, Jan. 31, 2023, https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/how-an-expanded-child-tax-credit-would-help-more-hard-working-new-jersey-families/. Analysis of an expanded child tax credit has shown that New Jersey could reduce child poverty by 25 percent with a $2,000 credit for children under age 6 and $1,700 for ages 6-18. See Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Columbia Center on Poverty and Social Policy, Child Tax Credit Options for Reducing Child Poverty (2022),  https://itep.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/Child-Tax-Credit-Options-New-Jersey-2022.pdf.

[xxix] New Jersey Division of Taxation, General Information: Inheritance and Estate Tax, O-10-C (Jan. 2017), https://www.nj.gov/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/inheritance/o10c.pdf.

[xxx] See Samantha Waxman, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, State Taxes on Inherited Wealth, Jun. 2021, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/issue-brief-state-taxes-on-inherited-wealth; Martin Poethke & Patrick Brennan, New Jersey Office of Legislative Services, Legislative Fiscal Estimate [Second Reprint], Assembly, No. 12, Oct. 12, 2016, https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bill-search/2016/A12/bill-text?f=A0500&n=12_E3.

[xxxi] N.J. Stat. Sec. 54:34-2

[xxxii] Andrew Van Dam, How inheritance data secretly explains U.S. inequality, Washington Post, Nov. 10, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/10/inheritance-america-taxes-equality/.

[xxxiii] State of New Jersey Department of the Treasury, Office of Revenue and Economic Analysis, Transfer Inheritance Tax: Statistical Report for Tax Years 2015-2017 (Jul. 28, 2021), https://www.nj.gov/treasury/economics/documents/pdf/stats/Transfer-Inheritance-Tax-Statistical-Report-TY-2015-2017.pdf at 5.

[xxxiv] Andrew Van Dam, How inheritance data secretly explains U.S. inequality, Washington Post, Nov. 10, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/10/inheritance-america-taxes-equality/.

[xxxv] Bhutta, Neil, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling, and Joanne W. Hsu (2020). “Disparities in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances,” FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 28, 2020, https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2797.

[xxxvi] N.J. Stat. Sec. 54:38-1.a.(4). Previously the minimum size of an estate to be eligible for the tax was $675,000. As with other estate taxes including the federal estate tax, wealthy residents could still avoid the tax through a variety of methods. See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Estate Tax Schemes: How America’s Most Fortunate Hide Their Wealth, Flout Tax Laws, and Grow the Wealth Gap, Oct. 12, 2017, https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/101217%20Estate%20Tax%20Whitepaper%20FINAL1.pdf.

[xxxvii] Martin Poethke & Patrick Brennan, New Jersey Office of Legislative Services, Legislative Fiscal Estimate [Second Reprint], Assembly, No. 12, Oct. 12, 2016, https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bill-search/2016/A12/bill-text?f=A0500&n=12_E3.

[xxxviii] Personal property made up 70 percent of estates, compared to real property at 18 percent in tax year 2017, the most recent year of available data State of New Jersey Department of the Treasury, Office of Revenue and Economic Analysis, Transfer Inheritance Tax: Statistical Report for Tax Years 2015-2017 (Jul. 28, 2021), https://www.nj.gov/treasury/economics/documents/pdf/stats/Transfer-Inheritance-Tax-Statistical-Report-TY-2015-2017.pdf at 6.

[xxxix]Samantha Waxman, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, State Taxes on Inherited Wealth, Jun. 2021, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/issue-brief-state-taxes-on-inherited-wealth, n.1.

[xl] Given that inheritance tax data is limited, this estimate is based on key assumptions. First, the estimate assumes that the effective tax rate on Class A (lineal descendants and spouses) and Class C (siblings) beneficiaries would be the same as the current effective tax rate on Class D beneficiaries if the current Class D marginal rate structure were applied to Class A and Class C beneficiaries. Second, it assumes that the exempt estate is evenly distributed over the currently exempt beneficiaries, even though lineal descendants and spouses likely inherit larger inheritances than unrelated persons and more distant relations. Third, the estimate assumes that the ratio of share of returns between Class C and Class D beneficiaries correlates with the size of the tax base for each category.

[xli] Sheila Reynertson, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Modernizing New Jersey’s Sales Tax Will Level

the Playing Field & Help the Economy Thrive, Feb. 2018,

https://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/NJPPSalesTaxReformsFeb2018.pdf.

[xlii] For a comprehensive look at New Jersey’s sales and use tax exemptions, see New Jersey Division of Taxation, New Jersey Sales Tax Guide, Tax Topic Bulletin S&U-4, July 2022, https://www.nj.gov/treasury/taxation/pdf/pubs/sales/su4.pdf.

[xliii] To see how New Jersey’s sales tax regressivity is counteracted by its progressive income tax, see Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Who Pays? New Jersey State and Local Tax Shares of Family Income (Jan. 2024), https://sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/itep/itep-whopays7-New-Jersey.pdf.

[xliv] Testimony of Peter Chen, Senior Policy Analyst, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Before Stay NJ Task Force, March 13, 2024, https://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/NJPP-StayNJ-Committee-Testimony-03-13-24.pdf.

[xlv] Based on analysis of data from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.

[xlvi] Based on analysis of data from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.

[xlvii] U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “SAPCE1 Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) by major type of product 1” (accessed Wednesday, October 16, 2024), https://apps.bea.gov/itable/?ReqID=70&step=1&_gl=1*1c592j9*_ga*NDUzNjQ0MzAyLjE3MjY1MTAxMDc.*_ga_J4698JNNFT*MTcyNjUxMDEwNy4xLjAuMTcyNjUxMDEwNy42MC4wLjA.#eyJhcHBpZCI6NzAsInN0ZXBzIjpbMSwyOSwyNSwzMSwyNiwyNywzMF0sImRhdGEiOltbIlRhYmxlSWQiLCI1MjQiXSxbIk1ham9yX0FyZWEiLCIwIl0sWyJTdGF0ZSIsWyIwIl1dLFsiQXJlYSIsWyIzNDAwMCJdXSxbIlN0YXRpc3RpYyIsWyIyIiwiMTMiXV0sWyJVbml0X29mX21lYXN1cmUiLCJMZXZlbHMiXSxbIlllYXIiLFsiLTEiXV0sWyJZZWFyQmVnaW4iLCItMSJdLFsiWWVhcl9FbmQiLCItMSJdXX0=.

[xlviii] U.S. Census Bureau, Survey of U.S. Businesses, The Number of Firms and Establishments, Employment, Annual Payroll, and Receipts by State, Industry, and Enterprise Employment Size: 2017 (2021), available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html.

[xlix] New Jersey Division of Taxation, New Jersey Sales Tax Guide, Tax Topic Bulletin S&U-4, July 2022, https://www.nj.gov/treasury/taxation/pdf/pubs/sales/su4.pdf, pp. 14-15.

[l] NetChoice, Big Rental’s Rules of the Road: Tax Loopholes and Sneaky Subsidies, Policy Note, April 2020, https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Turo-VLF-v.3.pdf, p. 9. The $174 million estimate adjusts the annual estimate of $142 million in 2020 for 2024 dollars.

[li] Sheila Reynertson, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Modernizing New Jersey’s Sales Tax Will Level

the Playing Field & Help the Economy Thrive, Feb. 2018, https://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/NJPPSalesTaxReformsFeb2018.pdf.

[lii] Pub. L. 2006, c.44.

[liii] Allison Pries, The housing market in N.J. has slowed — except for these types of homes, NJ Advance Media for NJ.com, Mar. 10, 2024, https://www.nj.com/realestate-news/2024/03/the-housing-market-in-nj-has-slowed-except-for-these-types-of-homes.html.

[liv] NJ Stat. Sec, 46:15-7.2 (2023)

[lv] Peter Chen, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Taxing “Super Luxury” Home Sales Could Make New Jersey Affordable for More Residents, Sep. 10, 2024, https://www.njpp.org/publications/blog-category/taxing-super-luxury-home-sales-could-make-new-jersey-affordable-for-more-residents/.

[lvi] Peter Chen, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Taxing “Super Luxury” Home Sales Could Make New Jersey Affordable for More Residents, Sep. 10, 2024, https://www.njpp.org/publications/blog-category/taxing-super-luxury-home-sales-could-make-new-jersey-affordable-for-more-residents/.

[lvii] Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, States Can Fight Corporate Tax Avoidance by Requiring Worldwide Combined Reporting, June 27, 2024, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/states-can-fight-corporate-tax-avoidance-by-requiring-worldwide-0.

[lviii] Josh Bivens, Economic Policy Institute, Reclaiming Corporate Tax Revenues, April. 14, 2022, https://www.epi.org/publication/reclaiming-corporate-tax-revenues/ at figure G.

[lix] Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, The “Single Sales Factor” Formula for State Corporate Taxes, Sept. 1, 2005, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/archive/3-27-01sfp.htm.

[lx] Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, States Can Fight Corporate Tax Avoidance by Requiring Worldwide Combined Reporting, June 27, 2024, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/states-can-fight-corporate-tax-avoidance-by-requiring-worldwide-0.

[lxi] N.J. Admin. Code § 18:7-21.15 (2024).

[lxii] Richard Phillips, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, A Simple Fix for a $17 Billion Loophole: How States Can Reclaim Revenue Lost to Tax Havens, Jan. 17, 2019, https://itep.org/a-simple-fix-for-a-17-billion-loophole/.

[lxiii] The state peaked at 485 auditors in fiscal year 2007.

[lxiv] In Fiscal Year 2007, New Jersey peaked at 485 auditors. See State of New Jersey Budget, Fiscal Year 2008-2009 at D-425. The per auditor assessment is based on the Revised FY 2024 figure in State of New Jersey Budget, Fiscal Year 2025, at D-402.

[lxv] In Fiscal Year 2007, New Jersey peaked at 485 auditors. See State of New Jersey Budget, Fiscal Year 2008-2009 at D-425. The per auditor assessment is based on the Revised FY 2024 figure in State of New Jersey Budget, Fiscal Year 2025, at D-402.

[lxvi] In Fiscal Year 2007, New Jersey peaked at 290 auditors. See State of New Jersey Budget, Fiscal Year 2008-2009 at D-425. The per collector collection is based on the Revised FY 2024 figure in State of New Jersey Budget, Fiscal Year 2025, at D-402.

[lxvii] NJPP analysis and inflation adjustment of state budget data from fiscal years 2004 through 2024. In fiscal year 2009, assessments reached over $1.5 billion in 2024 dollars.

[lxviii] Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS tops $1 billion in past-due taxes collected from millionaires; compliance efforts continue involving high-wealth groups, corporations, partnerships, July 11, 2024, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-tops-1-billion-in-past-due-taxes-collected-from-millionaires-compliance-efforts-continue-involving-high-wealth-groups-corporations-partnerships.

[lxix] Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Tax Compliance: Trends of IRS Audit Rates and Results for Individual Taxpayers by Income (May 2022), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104960.pdf, pp. 10-16.

[lxx] John Reitmeyer, The List: Tracking NJ’s 10 Credit-Rating Downgrades Under Gov. Christie, NJ Spotlight News, Nov. 21, 2016, https://www.njspotlightnews.org/2016/11/16-11-20-the-list-tracking-nj-s-10-credit-rating-downgrades-under-gov-christie/.

Reforming School Funding in New Jersey: Equity For Taxpayers, Excellence For Students

Executive Summary

There is growing consensus among New Jersey’s legislators, school leaders, educators, and other stakeholders: It’s time for the legislature to implement long-needed changes to its K-12 funding law, the School Funding Reform Act (SFRA). This report provides guidance for revising SFRA, focusing specifically on the issue of school revenues.

New Jersey’s local property taxes are less regressive than in neighboring states; this is, in no small part, due to the state school aid provided by SFRA. However, funding for schools has declined as a percentage of the state’s economy, suggesting there is room for improvement. To raise adequate funding, SFRA advises a local contribution from each school district; however, the calculation of that “Local Fair Share” (LFS) is not transparent, resulting in local tax inequities across otherwise similar school districts.

Specifically, this report examines how factors other than district wealth affect tax equity. Although the former Abbott districts pay less than similar districts in school taxes, their overall local tax burden (which includes municipal taxes) is similar. Disturbingly, districts with larger populations of students of color, especially Latinx/Hispanic students, pay much higher total tax rates than similarly wealthy districts. This report also finds that districts with larger shares of non-residential property raise more local revenue, even though districts are expected to contribute less under SFRA.

Given these findings, this report recommends that New Jersey reevaluate the revenue calculations in SFRA, paying particular attention to the effects on tax equity that arise from setting the property and income rates. The Department of Education should develop a set of indicators to monitor school property tax, total property tax, and overall tax equity, both at the local and state level. Given this report’s findings of inequitable tax rates for communities of color, these indicators should evaluate disparities in tax rates by race, ethnicity, and income.

This report also recommends that, once valid and equitable LFS amounts are calculated, localities should be required by the state to provide that share to their schools if they are below their adequacy threshold — adequacy as defined as the amount of funding needed for a school district to provide a constitutionally mandated, high-quality education — with the understanding that the state will also provide the aid needed for districts to reach their adequacy targets. Districts facing tax increases should be able to phase in those increases over time. To aid in the collection of these local revenues, non-residential properties should be taxed at the regional or state level, allowing for a more equitable distribution of revenues to the districts where they are most needed.

Finally, this report’s appendices include an update of earlier work focused on “adequacy” with a new analysis that supports previous recommendations: SFRA needs to be adjusted to provide more funding to the highest-poverty districts if they are to meet current, more rigorous standards.

Introduction

New Jersey’s public schools rely on a complex system of funding, drawing primarily from local and state taxes, with federal contributions playing a smaller, yet important, role. In 2008, the state’s School Funding Reform Act (SFRA) was enacted to ensure equitable distribution of state resources, particularly for districts with higher levels of poverty. However, the application of SFRA’s Local Fair Share (LFS) formula — determining how much a community should contribute based on its wealth and tax capacity — has led to significant disparities in local taxes.

In 2024, school funding became a contentious issue in New Jersey. Even as the state moved toward fully funding SFRA, some local districts objected to cuts in state aid. While subsequent legislation provided some relief to some of these districts, there is growing consensus that SFRA needs to be overhauled. Lawmakers are expected to propose changes to the formula at the heart of SFRA.

This report focuses on the revenue side of SFRA, examining how much the state expects school districts to raise through local property taxes. Specifically, it offers: (1) guidance on how to set valid “Local Fair Share” amounts for school districts, recognizing that different communities have varying capacities to raise local funds for schools; (2) recommends that SFRA should direct more state aid to communities that maintain relatively high tax rates but have lower property values, limiting their capacity to raise sufficient funds; and (3) suggests that the formula should set local fair share amounts that avoid regressive and inequitable tax rates, while ensuring that schools can secure the necessary revenues to provide a high-quality education.

Before the legislature begins this work, it’s important to take a step back and remember who SFRA affects and why its design is essential not only for school districts but all of New Jersey’s residents. Like all state school funding systems, SFRA was designed with two constituencies in mind:

  1. Students, who need adequately funded schools to receive a quality education
  2. Taxpayers, who should be taxed fairly based on their ability to pay

Regarding students: Statewide school funding systems, like New Jersey’s SFRA, are premised on the fact that different students in different contexts require different amounts of funding to reach the state’s outcome goals. For example, decades of research have shown that students in poverty, on average, require more resources in schools to achieve the same outcomes as more affluent students.[i] Students whose native language is not English or students with learning disabilities also require more resources to have more equitable educational opportunities.[ii]

Based on this research, New Jersey should be driving more resources toward school districts serving a greater number of students in poverty. In the decade before the Great Recession of 2008, the state was, in fact, doing just that: high-poverty districts were, on average, receiving considerably more revenues than low-poverty districts. This changed in 2010 by the end of the Christie administration when New Jersey’s highest- and lowest-poverty school districts were spending roughly the same amount per pupil. Appendix A presents more details.

SFRA was supposed to address the needs of higher-poverty school districts by setting higher funding targets for those districts. However, as previous reports have detailed, New Jersey still does not provide enough revenue for its highest-poverty school districts to meet the state’s current, rigorous educational goals.[iii] Appendix B includes an updated analysis of SFRA’s adequacy targets, revealing that the poverty weights in SFRA continue to be too low to meet state constitutional requirements.

Regarding taxpayers: A fair school funding system considers the wide differences in “tax capacity” — the ability to raise local revenues — between school districts. Keep in mind that local school revenues are raised almost entirely through property taxes. Districts with higher property values, per pupil, have an advantage over others: they can raise the necessary revenue to fund their schools without having to raise tax rates as high as districts with lower property values. Overall, districts with lots of property wealth can maintain relatively low tax rates while still generating the revenue their schools need.

SFRA was adopted, in part, to smooth out unevenness in school funding by providing statewide, systematic, and predictable adequacy budgets for all districts and children — not just the districts that were party to litigation. But SFRA also sets the share of those adequacy budgets that school districts will fund through local property taxes. By setting targets for spending and local revenue, SFRA attempts to allocate state revenues so that school funding is both adequate for students to receive an excellent education and fair for taxpayers.

Paying For Public Schools in New Jersey

Schools rely on three primary sources of revenue: local, state, and federal. As shown below (Figure 1), federal funding is a relatively small part of overall revenues. The majority of federal funding is allocated through programs such as Title I, which drives more revenues toward districts with higher poverty rates. These funds are supposed to “supplement, not supplant” other sources of funding.[iv] As a result, school funding systems focus primarily state and local revenue sources.

Figure 1

School Revenue is Largely Split Between State and Local Sources

Although overall school revenues in New Jersey are split nearly evenly between state and local taxes, the reliance on each revenue source varies widely across individual districts. SFRA requires more affluent districts to contribute more local funding to their schools because they have greater capacity to do so. Some districts get nearly all of their funding from local sources because they have greater property wealth and, therefore, greater tax capacity. Others get the majority of their revenues from the state because their property wealth and, therefore, tax capacity is relatively low. This approach helps to reduce the regressivity of New Jersey’s taxes; however, the current configuration of SFRA still results in substantial inequities in local property taxes. Correcting these inequities, which this report describes below, should be a primary objective of any reforms to SFRA.

To illustrate how different towns have different tax capacities, Table 1 shows data for three towns in Essex County. Millburn, which has very low child poverty, also has very high property values per pupil. Irvington, a town with high poverty, has comparatively low property values, while Belleville falls between the two. Because Irvington has much lower property values, it would have to tax itself at a much higher rate than Millburn to generate the same amount per pupil. In this illustration, the three districts all aim to raise $10,000 per pupil; but Irvington’s tax rate would need to be six times higher than Millburn’s to raise the same amount.

Table 1:

Wealthy Towns Can Afford Lower Property Tax Rates to Raise Similar Amounts of School Revenues: An Illustration from Essex County, NJ

As this example shows, without state aid, districts with low property values would have to pay much higher effective tax rates to fund their schools compared to districts with high property values. SFRA addresses this disparity by calculating a Local Fair Share (LFS): an amount local districts are expected to raise without imposing an undue tax burden. This report explores how SFRA calculates LFS, and how it could improve that calculation.

Appendix C further discusses the mix of taxes states use to fund schools, and the relative advantages or disadvantages of different revenue sources. To summarize: even though property taxes can be regressive, there are good reasons to include them in the mix of revenues used to fund schools. In a related analysis, Appendix D explores New Jersey’s tax effort: the percentage of the state’s economy devoted to K-12 education. Relative to other states, New Jersey does make a strong effort to fund its schools; however, given the decrease in effort following the Great Recession of 2008, there is still room for improvement.

Tax Progressivity in New Jersey and Its Neighbors

A tax system can be classified as either “progressive” or “regressive.” In a progressive tax system, taxes increase as income rises, whereas a regressive tax system requires low-wage workers to pay a greater share of their income in taxes than those with higher incomes. Because different taxes have different effects on tax equity, the mix of tax types in a state will affect its tax progressivity: the average differences in total effective tax rates for taxpayers of different incomes.

It is useful to compare New Jersey to its neighbors when assessing tax progressivity. Table 2 shows that individual property taxation in New Jersey is generally less regressive than Pennsylvania’s, and the lowest-income residents in New Jersey pay lower tax rates than their counterparts in New York. Any reforms of SFRA should not undermine this relative tax progressivity.

Table 2:

New Jersey's Least Wealthy Taxpayers Pay Lower Property Tax Rates Than in Neighboring States: Individual Property Taxes as a Share of Income in New Jersey and NeighborsLocal Fair Share

The core of SFRA’s revenue calculation is Local Fair Share (LFS). The theory behind SFRA’s LFS formula is that there is “fair” amount each community should pay to fund its schools, based on its capacity to raise revenues through local taxes. Once that amount is set, the state then comes in and provides additional funding to help school districts reach their adequacy targets. It’s important to note that until FY 2025, some districts have never received the full funding they were entitled to under SFRA to reach those targets.

Although local school revenues are almost entirely collected through property taxes, the school district’s tax capacity is determined by more than just property values. The LFS formula is:

Local Fair Share = [(District Aggregate Property Value * Property Rate) + (District Aggregate Personal Income * Income Rate)] / 2

Again, the theory behind LFS is that communities with less wealth — and, therefore, less tax capacity — should receive more state aid to fund their schools as they generate less from local property taxes than wealthier communities. This approach aims to make tax rates less regressive, if not fully progressive. However, in practice, the outcome doesn’t always align with this theory. To illustrate, we return to our three districts in Essex County, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3:

In New Jersey, The Wealthiest School Districts, and Some High-Poverty Districts, Have the Lowest School Tax Rates: An Illustration from Essex County, NJ

As expected, Millburn, with its significant property wealth, has a much higher LFS than Belleville, which in turn has a larger LFS than Irvington. But Millburn’s actual tax levy falls well below its LFS; this affluent town doesn’t need to raise taxes to its LFS level to adequately fund its schools and maintain its status as a high-performing district. Belleville, on the other hand, raises nearly exactly what its LFS calls for and has the highest effective school tax rate among the three communities. Unlike Irvington, Belleville was not party to the Abbott rulings; as discussed below, Abbott districts tend to have lower effective school tax rates than non-Abbott districts like Belleville. However, the total tax rates are not systemically lower in Abbott districts (see below), a crucial point when discussing how SFRA should calculate LFS.

Local Fair Share and Taxes

As mentioned above, the SFRA formula calculates a town’s LFS by multiplying its total property value by a property rate, and its total personal income by an income rate. The Education Commissioner determines both the property rate and the income rate. These rates vary annually and play a significant role in determining a district’s LFS and, consequently, the amount of state aid each district receives. By adjusting the rates, the Commissioner has the power to substantially alter the distribution of state aid to schools.

To illustrate the differences between property values and income as used in SFRA, Figure 2 shows (a) local fair share and (b) actual local revenue per pupil in relation to taxable property wealth per pupil; Figure 3 presents the same data but in relation to median household income. Overall, as property values or income increases, LFS and actual revenue also rise. However, the relationship between local fair share and taxable property wealth is stronger than the relationship between local fair share and median household income.[v] Likewise, the relationship between actual revenues and property wealth is stronger than the relationship between actual revenues and income.

Figure 2

New Jersey Expects Wealthier Districts to Pay More in School Taxes

Figure 3

"Local Fair Share" Correlates More Closely with Property Value Than With Income

Both property values and income are indicators of a district’s tax capacity; however, they do not always align perfectly. Figure 2 shows that the relationship between local fair share relationship and taxable property wealth is relatively consistent. As expected, districts with higher equalized property values contribute more toward their adequacy targets. Although some districts raise more than their LFS and others raise less, the variation is relatively minimal.

Figure 3, in contrast, shows the same trend but with a less consistent relationship between income and local share. Many districts are expected to raise relatively more revenues than their income levels would suggest, while others are expected to raise less.

Former Abbott districts, shown with a red marker, are typically very low in both taxable property wealth and median household income. Many of these districts continue to raise local revenue below their local fair share. This is due to primarily three reasons: First, funding to Abbott districts before SFRA was allocated without considering for local capacity, which allowed these districts to maintain very low school taxes — a practice that has persisted under the era of SFRA. Second, the local fair share is not a mandatory requirement; districts are not obligated to raise revenues equal to their LFS if they choose not to. Third, legal limits on tax increases prohibited these districts from raising taxes to meet the LFS requirement. Importantly, and as the analyses that follow show, the low school tax rates in these districts do not necessarily mean they have low total tax taxes.

The differences in the relationship between property values and local share versus income and local share highlight an important aspect of New Jersey’s school funding formula: The property and income rates set by SFRA have profound consequences for both school funding and local taxes. Changing one rate relative to the other will change a district’s LFS, even if the underlying tax capacity of that district remains the same. Again, the Education Commissioner set these rates, with no requirement to provide an explanation for how these rates are determined.

School Taxes vs. Total Local Taxes

School taxes represent only a portion of a locality’s total local taxes; additional revenues for other public services must also be raised through property taxes. Figure 4 shows effective school and total tax rates in relation to the Local Fair Share ratio for school districts.[vi] From left to right, districts generally range lower to higher in taxable wealth and income, which are key factors in determining local fair share requirements.

Effective school tax rates are relatively flat across the spectrum, with a slight increase in the middle. This suggests that state school aid over time has been effective in maintaining lower local school tax rates in the districts with the lowest wealth and income, thereby keeping those rates relatively equitable compared with wealthier districts. However, the same is not true for total property tax rates. Despite achieving some level of equity in local school rates, total local tax rates remain systematically higher in lower-wealth communities.

Figure 4

New Jersey's Local School Taxes Are Flat, but Overall Local Taxes are Regressive

Local Tax Equity

To better understand the effect of SFRA’s formula on tax equity, the authors conducted a series of regression analyses to identify factors associated with differences in (a) local fair share, (b) local revenue per pupil, (c) school tax rates, and (d) total tax rates. The full models, detailed in Appendix E, enable us to isolate the impacts of different district characteristics on tax rates while controlling for other variables. We included measures of taxable wealth per pupil, housing values, and median household income, analyzing data from 2013 to 2020. As expected, local shares and local revenues are higher in higher-income and higher-taxable wealth districts.

Derived from these regression models, Figure 5 focuses on factors associated with differences in local revenue. Former Abbott districts have local fair share expectations in line with their wealth and income (as controlled for in model); however, they generally raise significantly less local revenue per pupil than similar non-Abbott districts.

Figure 5

School Districts with Greater Shares of Black Students Are Expected to Pay Higher School Taxes

Figure 6 provides insight into why Abbott districts raise less revenue: their effective school tax rates are lower than other, similar districts. However, their total local tax rates are roughly equivalent to those of comparable districts. The interplay between school taxes, total taxes, and municipal obligations warrants further study; but for now, it is sufficient to note that total tax rates should be considered in any analysis and reform of the SFRA formula.

Figure 6

School Districts with Greater Shares of Hispanic Students Have Much Higher Local Tax Rates

The most important — but, given previous work, not unexpected — disparity revealed across the figures is that as Hispanic/Latinx enrollment increases, local revenues decline and local tax rates, particularly total tax rates, increase. Earlier NJPP reports have documented funding gaps in predominantly Hispanic/Latinx districts in New Jersey;[vii] the current models here provide additional evidence of this disturbing reality. These models also indicate that even the local fair share calculation disproportionately burdens these communities, holding other factors constant. This disparity is even more pronounced in Black communities, which face higher local share expectations, all else being equal. But it is Hispanic/Latinx communities that face significantly higher local taxation as a result. Reforms of SFRA must include changes that eliminate these persistent and inequitable tax effects on communities of color.

Another key issue involves taxable property wealth that is non-residential (commercial, industrial, etc.). In communities with proportionately more non-residential property, LFS is lower, yet the actual revenues raised are higher. In other words, school districts with more non-residential property raise more in local revenues, even though they are expected to raise less.

The easiest tax for which to gain political support is the tax on someone else. Property taxes on non-residential properties are partially borne by non-local residents: outsiders who don’t access the local schools still pay some school taxes when they conduct business within the district. However, this non-residential taxable wealth is unevenly distributed across taxing jurisdictions, often causing significant revenue-raising disparities. The value of those properties does not depend exclusively on the demand for their products or services within the same jurisdiction (think, for example, Paramus or Cherry Hill shopping areas). As such, school finance experts have long argued that such properties could or should be taxed regionally or statewide to balance these local tax distortions and provide more equitable statewide revenue distribution according to costs and needs across districts.[viii]

Conclusions and Recommendations

New Jersey’s School Funding Reform Act (SFRA) is due for a revision: it is not providing enough funding to the districts that need it the most, and its method for calculating local fair share should be improved.

Regarding the setting of adequacy targets, this report recommends:

  1. Strictly adhere to the schedule of updating the formula every three years, using cost-modeling methods to guide any changes.
  2. Implement data-driven, cost-modeling approaches based on current standards to determine base costs and weights in SFRA. This will increase the weights for poverty in SFRA’s formula, which is necessary for high-poverty districts to receive the revenues needed to meet New Jersey’s current, more rigorous standards. (See Appendix B for more)

Regarding the revenue side of SFRA, this report recommends the following:

  1. The New Jersey Department of Education (NJDOE) should develop a set of indicators to monitor the equity of school property taxes, total property taxes, and overall tax burdens annually.
  2. NJDOE should then use these indicators to evaluate tax disparities related to race, ethnicity, and income of taxpayers and students.
  3. Using these indicators, the state should reassess the property and income rates in the Local Fair Share (LFS) part of the SFRA formula, aiming to establish rates that promote goals of tax equity and progressivity.
  4. Once Local Fair Share amounts are set to reasonable and equitable levels that are not an undue burden on local taxpayers, the state should require school districts that are under SFRA adequacy to raise their full LFS through local taxes. Districts should provide their LFS with the understanding that the state will fully fund SFRA to meet current outcome goals. Again, total local taxes should be accounted for when calculating LFS. If districts need to raise local taxes rates to meet their LFS, those rates should be phased in over time to avoid any shocks to taxpayers.
  5. Regionalize industrial and commercial property taxes to distribute their revenues more equitably and correct racially and ethnically disparate local share requirements.

Appendices

Appendix A: An Update On New Jersey School Funding Equity

When New Jersey adopted the School Funding Reform Act (SFRA) in 2008, the state already had one of the country’s most progressive state school funding systems, targeting substantial additional state funding to the districts, schools, and children that needed those resources most. However, the distribution of state aid was determined largely by decades of litigation (known as the Abbott rulings), resulting in state aid targeted explicitly to only those districts that brought the litigation. While this drove a significant amount of revenue to the school districts that needed it the most, state aid — and its influence on local property taxation — was still uneven: some districts needed more financial help to fund their schools and keep their local taxes equitable.

Unfortunately, the adoption of SFRA was met with the onset of the Great Recession and Governor Chris Christie’s subsequent decision to cut state aid to schools. It is not an overstatement to say that 2008 represents the beginning of the collapse of school funding equity in New Jersey. While recent years have seen some improvement, the consequences of this collapse still affect many New Jersey school children and taxpayers.  

Figure 7 shows how the recession and Christie’s cuts impeded New Jersey’s effort to equitably fund its school districts. In the early to mid-1990s, the ratio of current spending per pupil to state and local revenue per pupil were roughly the same (1:1, or index of 1.0) for districts that had very low child poverty rates compared to those that had very high child poverty rates. This was despite the widely known fact that children in poverty need more school funding to ensure equal educational opportunities.[ix] However, throughout the 2000’s, the Abbott rulings forced the state to increase aid to many high-poverty districts, leading to more equitable funding. This trend reversed during the Christie Administration, and by 2019, New Jersey was back to where it had been in the early 1990s, with school spending becoming essentially flat once again. In recent years, the state’s movement towards fully funding SFRA has at least prevented further erosion; however, there has only been modest progress toward restoring the level of progressive school funding seen in 2008.

Figure 7

The Least Affluent School Districts Used to Get Much More Funding Than the Most Affluent

It’s important to recognize that the erosion of progressivity in New Jersey’s school funding is not solely the result of underfunding SFRA. Under the law, The New Jersey Department of Education is required to prepare an Educational Adequacy Report (EAR) every three years. The EAR is supposed to recalibrate the SFRA formula, adjusting its components to set both appropriate adequacy targets and fair levels of local revenues for schools. However, since the passage of SFRA, the department has either shirked this responsibility (under the Christie administration) or recalibrated the formula without considering factors such as the state’s increasing expectations for student outcomes.[x]

Appendix B: Setting Adequacy Targets: An Update

Previous NJPP reports about SFRA focused largely on how to target “adequacy,” which refers to the amount needed for a school district to provide a constitutionally mandated education that allows students to meet the state’s increasingly rigorous standards.[xi] Here, this report gives an update of this work, using current data to calculate the latest version of these adequacy targets. This analysis finds, once again, that school districts with the highest rates of poverty are not spending enough to meet New Jersey’s new, more rigorous standards.

As described in earlier NJPP reports, SFRA accounts for different student needs through a system where “base amounts” and “weights” are set by the state, resulting in an adequacy target for every school district.[xii] The base amount is the amount of revenue per student a school district needs to educate an elementary school student who is not economically disadvantaged and is not an English Language Learner (ELL). When a district counts its students, each student is “weighted:” students who are economically disadvantaged, ELLs, or in upper grades add more to the weighted student count. That count is multiplied by the base to set the district’s adequacy target. While there are other factors accounted for in SFRA, the base and the weights are at the heart of the law’s adequacy formula.

For SFRA to validly determine how much each New Jersey school district needs, its base amount and weights need to be set correctly. The base weight must reflect the true cost of educating an elementary student so they can achieve the goals the state has set. Likewise, the weights must reflect the additional cost of educating an economically disadvantaged, ELL, or upper-grade student. If the base and weights are wrong, a district will not have the revenues it needs to be able to achieve its outcome goals. The Education Adequacy Report (EAR), which is supposed to update the SFRA base and weights every three years, is, therefore, critically important: it must set the base and weights correctly for schools to receive the funding to be successful.

As noted in previous work, New Jersey has raised its outcome goals for students over the past two decades, but has failed to change its school funding formula to align with these new goals.[xiii] To measure the extent of the problem, previous reports from NJPP have used the National Education Cost Model (NECM).[xiv] Grounded in actual data and time-tested empirical methods, the NECM gives a valid, reasonable estimate of the cost of students achieving, on average, a particular educational outcome. What follows here are the latest NECM cost estimates; see the table at the end of this appendix for model specifications and estimates.

Figure 8 shows the average current spending, SFRA adequacy budget, and NECM-predicted costs by school district poverty quintile from lowest poverty to highest. Regarding existing per pupil spending (the grey bars), the average is just over $20,000, regardless of whether a district is very low in child poverty concentration or much higher. Like in the early 1990s (see Figure 7 above), spending per pupil is currently flat in New Jersey with respect to poverty, despite the presence of a poverty weighting factor in SFRA.

The lighter blue bars represent what SFRA would provide as an “adequacy budget” for each group. Adequacy budgets for low-poverty districts are just over $15,000 per pupil; for high-poverty districts, just over $20,000 per pupil. SFRA is, therefore, somewhat progressive; however, that progressivity is offset by local choices in affluent districts to spend above that level. The fact that low-poverty districts choose to spend much more than their SFRA adequacy targets suggests that those targets are well below what New Jersey residents want for the education of their communities’ children.

Figure 8

High-Poverty Districts Need More Funding to Meet Higher Education Standards

The medium blue bars estimate the per pupil cost — predicted from the NECM — to achieve reading and math outcomes equivalent to the Massachusetts average, which is slightly higher than the New Jersey average, and, as discussed in our previous reports, on track with college and career readiness.[xv] New Jersey school districts with low to moderate levels of poverty currently spend at or above what they’d need to achieve these outcomes (and most of these districts achieve these outcomes). SFRA, however, provides sufficient adequacy budgets only for the state’s more affluent districts.

In contrast, the highest poverty districts continue to show a large gap between what the NECM says they should spend and what they actually do spend. Worse, the gap between what NECM says districts should spend and their SFRA targets is even larger; in other words, SFRA adequacy targets for high-poverty districts are well below where they should be to meet the goals the state has set. As reported in the past, these analyses suggest the poverty weights in SFRA are too low to meet the state’s current, more rigorous standards.[xvi] Properly recalibrating SFRA will require bringing these weights up, using current data and modern costing methods to set valid targets.

National Education Cost Model vs. Current Spending and SFRA Targets

Appendix C: Sources of Revenues

In New Jersey, as in many other states, state and local revenues are collected through different types of taxes. The table below lays out the features of the three main revenue sources for the state: property taxes, sales taxes, and income taxes.

Property taxes are collected primarily at the local level, although sometimes not directly by the school district but by the parent government (city or town), which in turn allocates the revenue to local schools. As illustrated above, property taxes are highly inequitable across localities, meaning that affluent communities often have lower tax rates than those with less property wealth. However, property taxes are also relatively stable in terms of the revenue they generate, making them particularly attractive to school districts because they provide consistent funding regardless of economic fluctuations.

While property taxes can be regressive, they tend to be less so, on average, than sales taxes. Sales taxes are primarily state source taxes but increasingly include local option sales taxes, which in some states make up a substantial share of local revenues. Sales tax revenues are moderately volatile but less so than income tax revenues.

Table 4 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of different sources of tax revenues. Because each type of tax has its own trade-offs between property, sales, and income taxes, state tax systems tend to rely on some combination of all three.

Table 4: The Pros and Cons of Different Tax Revenue Sources

*Increased use of Local Option Sales taxes

Appendix D: New Jersey’s Tax Effort

School finance researchers often describe the level of state and local funding in terms of effort: the percentage of a state’ or locality’s tax capacity that is spent on schooling. When calculating a state’s effort, tax capacity is often measured as the total personal income for the state; the percentage of that income spent on schools is its effort.

Figure 9 shows the effort of all 50 states to fund schools from 1997 to 2021 with New Jersey highlighted. From 2000 to 2005, New Jersey dramatically increased its effort, coinciding with the targeting of substantial funding to higher-need districts following the Abbott decisions. But like nearly every other state, New Jersey decreased its effort toward funding K-12 education following the Great Recession of 2008—2009. Had New Jersey simply maintained its effort level from 2006 — in other words, made the policy choice to continue spending the same percentage of its economy on K-12 schooling each year — revenue could have been up to 14.3% higher, on average, from 2016 to 2021.[xvii] 

Figure 9

New Jersey's Effort to Fund Schools is Relatively Strong, But Has Declined in the Last Decade

While Figure 9 shows K-12 education revenues as a share of income, Figure 10, below, compares total state and local taxes as a share of income for New Jersey among other states. Although taxes in New Jersey are higher than in many other states, the state is not an extreme outlier, with several other states collecting higher amounts proportionally. Notably, New Jersey ranks somewhat lower on total state and local taxes as a share of income than it does on K-12 effort. In addition, and like K-12 effort, total taxes as a share of income have declined since their pre-recession peak. These analyses suggest that while New Jersey makes a relatively strong effort to fund its public schools, there remains room for improvement.

Figure 10

Total Taxes in New Jersey Have Declined Since the Great Recession

Appendix E: Local Fair Share, Effective Tax Rates (School and Total), and Local Revenue per pupil Models

 


End Notes

[i] Duncombe, W. D., & Yinger, J. (2005). How much more does a disadvantaged student cost? Economics of Education Review, 24(5), 513–532.

Baker, B. D., Weber, M., & Srikanth, A. (2021). Informing Federal School Finance Policy with Empirical Evidence. Journal of Education Finance, 47(1), 1–25.

Jackson, C. K., & Mackevicius, C. L. (2024). What Impacts Can We Expect from School Spending Policy? Evidence from Evaluations in the United States. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 16(1), 412–446. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220279

[ii] Augenblick, Palaich and Associates. (2011). Analysis of New Jersey’s Census-Based Special Education Funding System. http://nj.gov/education/sff/sereport.pdf

[iii] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2023) Unlocking Academic Success: Revitalizing New Jersey’s School Funding Formula for Student Achievement. New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/unlocking-academic-success-revitalizing-new-jerseys-school-funding-formula-for-student-achievement/

[iv] New Jersey Department of Education, Title I, Part A, Supplement Not Supplant Guidance  https://www.nj.gov/education/title1/resources/docs/TitleISupplementnotSupplantGuidanceDocument.pdf

[v] “Median household income” is a different measure than what is used for SFRA’s formula: SFRA totals the district’s residents’ income and multiplies it by the rate. We use median income here as it better approximates the relationship between local share and the “typical” household income for a district.

[vi] “Local Fair Share ratio” is the calculated LFS amount of revenues from local sources vs. the amount from state sources. An LFS ratio of 1 (1:1) means the calculated LFS is equal to the amount from state sources; an LFS ratio of 0.5 (1:2) means the calculated LFS is equal to one-half of the amount from state sources. As tax capacity rises, the LFS ratio will also rise; for example, districts with a LFS of 2 will have greater property wealth and income—and, consequently, tax capacity—than districts with an LFS of 0.5.

[vii] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2022) Separate and Unequal: Racial and Ethnic Segregation and the Case for School Funding Reparations in New Jersey. New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/separate-and-unequal-racial-and-ethnic-segregation-and-the-case-for-school-funding-reparations-in-new-jersey/

[viii] Brent, B. O. (1999). An analysis of the influence of regional nonresidential expanded tax base approaches to school finance on measures of student and taxpayer equity. Journal of Education Finance, 24(3), 353-378.

Ladd, H. F., & Harris, E. W. (1995). Statewide taxation of nonresidential property for education. Journal of Education Finance, 21(1), 103-122.

Ladd, H. F. (1976). State-wide taxation of commercial and industrial property for education. National Tax Journal, 29(2), 143-153.

[ix] See Footnote #1.

[x] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2022) New Jersey School Funding: The Higher the Goals, the Higher the Costs. New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/new-jersey-school-funding-the-higher-the-goals-the-higher-the-costs/

[xi] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2023) Unlocking Academic Success: Revitalizing New Jersey’s School Funding Formula for Student Achievement. New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/unlocking-academic-success-revitalizing-new-jerseys-school-funding-formula-for-student-achievement/

[xii] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2020) School Funding in New Jersey: A Fair Future for All. New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/school-funding-in-new-jersey-a-fair-future-for-all/

[xiii] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2023) Unlocking Academic Success: Revitalizing New Jersey’s School Funding Formula for Student Achievement. New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/unlocking-academic-success-revitalizing-new-jerseys-school-funding-formula-for-student-achievement/

[xiv] Baker, B. D., Weber, M., & Srikanth, A. (2021). Informing Federal School Finance Policy with Empirical Evidence. Journal of Education Finance, 47(1), 1–25.

[xv] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2022) New Jersey School Funding: The Higher the Goals, the Higher the Costs. New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/new-jersey-school-funding-the-higher-the-goals-the-higher-the-costs/

[xvi] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2023) Unlocking Academic Success: Revitalizing New Jersey’s School Funding Formula for Student Achievement. New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/unlocking-academic-success-revitalizing-new-jerseys-school-funding-formula-for-student-achievement/

[xvii] School Finance Indicators Database, State School Finance Profile, New Jersey, 2020-21 School Year https://www.schoolfinancedata.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/profiles24_NJ.pdf

Prison Profiteers: How Private Companies Profit From Prison Phone Calls and Harm New Jersey Residents

For the thousands of people incarcerated in New Jersey’s prisons and jails, a phone call to loved ones can make a significant difference during challenging and isolating times. Research consistently shows that communication between people behind bars and their support systems helps to improve their mental health in the short term and strengthen the relationships needed for a successful reentry in the long term.[i]

Yet, despite the importance of these connections with the outside world, communication is increasingly out of reach for individuals incarcerated in New Jersey due to the exorbitant fees charged by private, for-profit telecommunication companies that have monopoly contracts with corrections agencies.[ii] Because incarcerated individuals and their families bear these costs, fees for prison communication disproportionately harm women, people of color, and families with low incomes, exacerbating racial and economic inequities within the criminal legal system and throughout the state.[iii]

By moving away from this profit-driven model and providing accessible communication across the state’s prisons and county jails, New Jersey can keep families connected, allow people who are incarcerated to better plan for their releases, and finally put a stop to the predatory practices that cost families across the state $15 million every year, based on analysis by Worth Rises.[iv] While this is an incredible burden for families, the expense for the state is a small fraction — 1.4 percent — of the nearly $1.1 billion correctional facilities budget.[v]

How We Got Here: The Rise of Private Prison Communications

Until the 1980s, prisons in the United States managed access to phone calls through AT&T, with many facilities providing collect calls at prices comparable to the cost of a collect call on the outside.[vi] With the rapid growth of incarceration fueled by the War on Drugs, the federal break-up of the AT&T monopoly, and the subsequent “prison boom” of the 1980s, private telecommunication companies emerged, and their business models capitalized on the growing number of prisons and jails across the United States, cornering the market, commissions to prison and jail administrators, and making calls more expensive.[vii]

New Jersey is one of many states that contracts with private telecom companies to provide communication services for its prisons, including phone calls, electronic messaging, and video calls. The state currently contracts with two companies: ViaPath, formerly Global Tel Link, and JPay, a subsidiary of Securus Technologies.[viii] Founded in 1989, ViaPath was one of the first companies to transform prison phone calls into a multimillion-dollar industry.[ix] JPay, founded in 2002 as a prison money-wiring service, has since emerged as one of the largest prison technology contractors in the country.[x]

ViaPath and JPay make up nearly 80 percent of the prison communication market share in the United States, and their monopoly contracts allow them to charge exorbitant fees and generate hundreds of millions of dollars in profit from incarcerated individuals and their families.[xi] The two companies have each faced their fair share of price-gouging complaints, with ViaPath, ordered to pay $67 million to settle a 2015 class-action lawsuit, and JPay ordered to pay $6 million in fines and restitution in 2021 for charging excessive and illegal fees.[xii]

In 2023, ViaPath and JPay brought in a combined $6.6 million in revenue from their monopolies on phone calls, e-messages, and video calls in New Jersey’s state prisons.[xiii] Phone calls made up nearly three-quarters of prison communication revenue in New Jersey, with ViaPath bringing in more than $4.8 million from state prisons. Electronic messaging made up 24 percent of prison communication revenue, and video calls made up the remaining 2.5 percent. JPay brought in a combined $1.7 million from electronic messages and video calls.

Private Telecom Companies Generate $6.6 Million in Revenue from New Jersey Prisons

How it Works: The High Cost of Private Prison Communications

Phone calls are the primary communication channel in New Jersey’s prisons, with ViaPath charging fees of about $0.044 per minute at state facilities and even higher rates at some county jails.[xiv] High fees, combined with call limits of fifteen minutes, make it less likely that incarcerated individuals will stay in touch with their families, straining the relationships that are critical to their success when they are released.

According to a recent survey by the New Jersey Office of Corrections Ombudsperson, many people incarcerated in New Jersey do not feel they have enough time on the telephone to maintain relationships with their loved ones.[xv] Still, the majority indicated the phone as their preferred method of communication.[xvi]

Incarcerated individuals also rely on a basic form of electronic messaging offered by JPay, similar to email, but without direct internet access. Electronic messages are composed on low-tech tablets sold by JPay,[xvii] often for $50, and then connected to a kiosk that delivers the message. Sending messages requires the purchase of credits, known as “stamps,” that cost $0.35 each.[xviii] Each message requires one stamp, and additional stamps are needed for receiving a message with a photo attached or sending one that exceeds a single page in length.

Video calls offered by JPay operate on the same system of kiosks and tablets as electronic messages. At $9.95 for thirty minutes,[xix] they are extraordinarily expensive for incarcerated individuals and their families. It’s worth noting that not all correctional facilities in New Jersey currently provide access to video calls.

Prison Communication Services: Fee Rates and Average Costs

 

While this business model results in hundreds of millions of dollars in profits for companies like ViaPath and JPay, it has devastating consequences for incarcerated people and their families, with repercussions that reverberate into communities across New Jersey and the rest of the nation.

How Private Prison Communications Harm New Jersey Families

The cost of prison communications imposes a severe burden on incarcerated individuals and their families, who often shoulder the cost. Poverty and incarceration are inextricably linked in the United States, where the vast majority of people incarcerated are low-income, while incarceration itself results in greater poverty.[xx] For these individuals and families, any cost associated with communication can be an insurmountable challenge that perpetuates cycles of poverty and inequality.

Fees for phone calls, video calls, and electronic messages add up quickly, with incarcerated individuals and their families paying $15 million annually to stay connected. This includes $7.4 million spent across New Jersey’s state prisons and an additional $7.6 million across county jails.[xxi]

For incarcerated individuals, wages inside correctional facilities are far too low to afford the fees charged by ViaPath and JPay to stay in regular contact with their families and support systems, forcing their families to foot the bill. Incarcerated workers are exempt from New Jersey’s minimum wage law and work at a daily, not hourly, rate. They can earn anywhere from $1.60 to $7.50 a day, with most workers earning between $1.60 and $3.00, on average.[xxii]

For the large portion of people in prison who earn the lowest daily pay rate ($1.60), making a phone call home or sending an email costs them nearly half of their earnings for the day. For example, it would cost $1.36 to have a 15 minute phone call and receive one email with a photo attachment, nearly wiping out one’s daily earnings.[xxiii] In Fiscal Year 2022, the total wages paid to all incarcerated people in New Jersey was $9.2 million.[xxiv] Put another way, if people who are incarcerated relied solely on their wages to pay for communication, 72 percent of their total earnings would have gone toward calls and messages.

However, people in prison must pay for more than just communications, such as, basic hygiene items from commissary,[xxv] child support, and some medicines, and with such low wages, they are often unable to afford the communications they so desperately need. As a result, the vast majority of costs end up falling onto the shoulders of family members and other loved ones, who are disproportionately women of color.

Nationally, one in three families with an incarcerated loved one goes into debt due to the fees associated with trying to stay connected.[xxvi] Of family members responsible for incarceration-related costs, 83 percent were women, with women of color disproportionately affected given the racial disparities in the criminal legal system.[xxvii] New Jersey has the highest Black-white disparity in incarceration in the country, with 61 percent of incarcerated individuals identifying as Black and only 22 percent as white.[xxviii]

The for-profit prison communication system has far-reaching effects on the finances and overall well-being of families across the state. In a recent op-ed in The Star-Ledger, Malika McCall, a mother and business owner in Newark whose two sons were incarcerated in New Jersey, detailed the financial and emotional toll of not being able to afford to keep in touch with her children. Malika’s story is both heartbreaking and all too common for families with a loved one incarcerated in New Jersey.

From going into debt to not taking calls because of an inability to pay, the consequences of high fees extend beyond financial stress; they irreparably harm the bonds between parents and their children and take a significant emotional toll on families already struggling to get by.

Building Bridges and Connecting Families with Free Prison Communications

There is a growing movement of states and local governments recognizing the importance of connecting families and removing barriers to communication. In the last three years, five states and multiple jurisdictions, including New York City, have eliminated fees associated with prison communication, setting an example for New Jersey and other states to follow.[xxix] And just this summer, the Federal Communications Commission passed new rules that put caps on phone and video calling rates in prisons and jails and ban corporate kickbacks on these services to prison and jail administrators.[xxx]

At the core of accessible prison communications is family, human dignity, and a commitment to ensuring the successful return to community. When incarcerated people can regularly connect with their families, it fosters a sense of hope, encourages productive behavior, and enhances participation in rehabilitation programs.[xxxi] Moreover, facilitating open lines of communication between incarcerated individuals and their support networks stands out as one of the most effective strategies to bolster reentry outcomes and reduce recidivism rates.[xxxii] By eliminating communication fees, New Jersey can keep families connected and finally put a stop to the predatory practices that cost families across the state $15 million every year.


End Notes

[i] Wang, L. Research roundup: The positive impacts of family contact for incarcerated people and their families, Prison Policy Initiative. Decmber 21, 2021  https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/12/21/family_contact/

[ii] Worth Rises. The Prison Industry How It Started How It Works and How It Harms. December, 2020. Pg. 48-49. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58e127cb1b10e31ed45b20f4/t/621682209bb0457a2d6d5cfa/1645642294912/The+Prison+Industry+How+It+Started+How+It+Works+and+How+It+Harms+December+2020.pdf

[iii] deVuono-powell, Saneta et al. Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Families. Ella Baker Center, September, 2015. Pg. 9 https://ellabakercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Who-Pays-exec-summary.pdf

[iv] Based on fiscal analysis done by Worth Rises using current DOC and jail population data and 2023 usage data including taxes and deposit fees paid by families. This figure includes the costs associated with both prisons ($7.4 million) and county jails ($7.6 million). Methodology is on file with author.

[v] Governor’s Detailed Budget. FY2025. Pg. B-2. https://www.nj.gov/treasury/omb/publications/25budget/pdf/FY2025-Budget-Detail-Full.pdf

[vi]  Worth Rises. The Prison Industry How It Started How It Works and How It Harms. December, 2020. Pg. 48. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58e127cb1b10e31ed45b20f4/t/621682209bb0457a2d6d5cfa/1645642294912/The+Prison+Industry+How+It+Started+How+It+Works+and+How+It+Harms+December+2020.pdf

[vii] Worth Rises. The Prison Industry How It Started How It Works and How It Harms. December, 2020. Pg. 48. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58e127cb1b10e31ed45b20f4/t/621682209bb0457a2d6d5cfa/1645642294912/The+Prison+Industry+How+It+Started+How+It+Works+and+How+It+Harms+December+2020.pdf

[viii] JPay was acquired by Securus in 2015 and has been referred to by both names by the press and other stakeholders.(https://theappeal.org/prison-tablets-ipads-jpay-securus-gtl/) New Jersey is currently looking to cut ties with JPay and have ViaPath take over all prison communications.(https://www.njspotlightnews.org/2024/04/nj-prison-ombudsperson-examines-phone-access-policies-urges-corrections-department-change-policies/)

[ix] Schwenk, K. Wall Street Is Finding New Ways to Milk the Prison System. Jacobin. February, 2024.https://jacobin.com/2024/02/prison-phone-calls-telecom-revenue

[x] Law, V. Captive Audience: How Companies Make Millions Charging Prisoners to Send An Email.  Wired. August, 2018. https://www.wired.com/story/jpay-securus-prison-email-charging-millions/

[xi] Wagner, P. and Bertram, W. State of Phone Justice 2022, Prison Policy Initiative. December, 2022. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/state_of_phone_justice_2022.html

[xii]  Land, G. Prison Phone Co. to Pay $67M to Settle Claims It Looted ‘Inactive’ Accounts. Law.com. December, 2021. https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2021/12/06/prison-phone-co-to-pay-67m-to-settle-claims-it-looted-inactive-accounts/?slreturn=20240626133133 & Flitter, E .JPay, a prison contractor, was fined over fees it charged to former prisoners. New York Times. October, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/business/jpay-prison-card-fees.html

[xiii] Data NJPP received from NJ DOC. These figures are for state correctional facilities alone and do not include revenues from county jails.

[xiv] Data Worth Rises acquired while performing their fiscal analysis.The prices vary in county jails, but the average rate is $0.051 per minute, or $0.77 for a 15 minute phone call.

[xv] NJ Office of the Corrections Ombudsperson. Visits and Phone Calls, Special Report. April, 2024. Pg. 8. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24539968-special-report-on-visits-and-phone-calls_corrections-ombudsperson

[xvi] NJ Office of the Corrections Ombudsperson. Visits and Phone Calls, Special Report. April, 2024. Pg. 6. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24539968-special-report-on-visits-and-phone-calls_corrections-ombudsperson

[xvii] Law, V. Captive Audience: How Companies Make Millions Charging Prisoners to Send An Email.  Wired. August, 2018. https://www.wired.com/story/jpay-securus-prison-email-charging-millions/

[xviii]  NJ Office of the Corrections Ombudsperson. Visits and Phone Calls, Special Report. April, 2024. Pg. 8. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24539968-special-report-on-visits-and-phone-calls_corrections-ombudsperson

[xix] NJ Office of the Corrections Ombudsperson. Visits and Phone Calls, Special Report. April, 2024. Pg. 8. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24539968-special-report-on-visits-and-phone-calls_corrections-ombudsperson

[xx] deVuono-powell, Saneta et al. Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Families. Ella Baker Center, September, 2015. Pg. 9 https://ellabakercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Who-Pays-exec-summary.pdf

Note: In New Jersey, data from the Office of the Public Defender suggests that 90% of all criminal defendants are indigent, or without resources. https://pub.njleg.gov/publications/reports/CSDC%20Third%20Report.pdf

[xxi] Based on fiscal analysis done by Worth Rises using current DOC and jail population data and 2023 usage data including taxes and deposit fees paid by families.

[xxii] DiFilippo, D.  Inflation hits inmates’ wallets, even as their wages have flatlined. NJ Monitor. September, 2022. https://newjerseymonitor.com/2022/09/28/inflation-hits-inmates-wallets-even-as-their-wages-have-flatlined/  & NJ DOC response to FY24 budget hearing questions. 2023. Pg. 20-21. https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/publications/budget/governors-budget/2024/DOC_response_2024.pdf Note that the wages now range from 1.60 to 7.50 due to an increase in wages in April, May and June of 2024.

[xxiii] NJPP analysis of data obtained from Worth Rises and NJDOC

[xxiv] NJ DOC response to FY24 budget hearing questions. 2023. Pg. 21. https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/publications/budget/governors-budget/2024/DOC_response_2024.pdf

[xxv] Detailed NJDOC commissary price list acquired by The Appeal. 2024. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24444224-nj_doc_combined_commissary_lists

[xxvi]  deVuono-powell, Saneta et al. Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Families. Ella Baker Center, September, 2015. Pg. 9 https://ellabakercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Who-Pays-exec-summary.pdf

[xxvii] deVuono-powell, Saneta et al. Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Families. Ella Baker Center, September, 2015. Pg. 9 https://ellabakercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Who-Pays-exec-summary.pdf

[xxviii] NJ Department of Corrections. Incarcerated Persons In New Jersey Correctional Institutions

On January 1, 2024, By Race/Ethnic Identification. January, 2024. https://www.nj.gov/corrections/pdf/offender_statistics/2024/By_Race-Ethnicity_2024.pdf

[xxix] Kaiser-Schatzlein, R. Is This the End of Prison Phone Fees? Mother Jones. October 2023. https://www.motherjones.com/criminal-justice/2023/08/conneticut-prison-phone-fees-securus/

[xxx] Bertram, W. FCC votes to slash prison and jail calling rates and ban corporate kickbacks. Prison Policy Initiative. July 2024. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2024/07/18/fcc-vote/

[xxxi] Wang, L. Research roundup: The positive impacts of family contact for incarcerated people and their families, Prison Policy Initiative. Decmber 21, 2021  https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/12/21/family_contact/ & Worth Rises. The Prison Industry How It Started How It Works and How It Harms. December, 2020. Pg. 52. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58e127cb1b10e31ed45b20f4/t/621682209bb0457a2d6d5cfa/1645642294912/The+Prison+Industry+How+It+Started+How+It+Works+and+How+It+Harms+December+2020.pdf

[xxxii] Petersilia, Joan. When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry. Oxford University Press, 2006, p 246.

Outdated and Ineffective: Why New Jersey Needs to Update Its Top Anti-Poverty Program

New Jersey’s economy has changed in many ways since the 1990s, but the state’s premier social safety net program has remained largely the same. Designed to support families with little to no income, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) has not kept up with the rising cost of living or the evolving needs of families with children.

The program maintains outdated administrative barriers that prevent many families from receiving assistance when they need it most.[i] For the families that do qualify, the monthly grant amount remains far too low to cover basic necessities or protect against the harms of deep poverty. By updating the state’s TANF program and raising benefit levels to reflect today’s economic realities, New Jersey can help families build a more stable future for themselves, their children, and their communities.

Supporting families as they navigate financial challenges has far-reaching benefits in both the short- and long-term. Beyond the immediate relief of helping families put food on the table and keep a roof over their heads, having a stable household income increases the likelihood of children succeeding in school, pursuing higher education, and finding good-paying jobs as adults.[ii]

A stronger, more effective safety net would also help address systemic economic disparities across the state. Due to the legacy of policies that prevented people from fully participating in the economy based on their race or gender, women, Black, and Hispanic/Latinx residents of New Jersey have disproportionately lower incomes and are the least likely to afford rising costs in housing, transportation, health care, and other essential needs.[iii]

To address rising costs, deep-seeded inequities, and ensure that TANF fulfills its intended purpose, New Jersey must raise the monthly grant amount to at least 50 percent of the federal poverty level. Additionally, grant amounts should be adjusted for inflation so the program remains an effective safety net in future years. These reforms would promote stronger families and more resilient communities where everyone has the resources they need and deserve.

TANF Grant Amounts Fall Short in Today’s Economy

Targeted to families with the lowest incomes, New Jersey’s TANF program falls significantly short of meeting even the most basic needs, let alone enabling families to break the cycle of poverty and become self-sufficient. The current TANF grant only amounts to half of what the federal government considers “deep poverty,” which is 50 percent of the federal poverty level.[iv] Put another way, the current TANF grant in New Jersey is equal to only one-fourth of the federal government’s threshold for living in poverty. It’s worth noting that these are nationwide metrics that do not account for geographic differences in the cost of living, so this significantly undercounts the number of people living in poverty in states like New Jersey, where costs are higher.

For a family of three, the TANF monthly grant provides a maximum of $559 per month – only about $6,708 per year.[v] This is more than $6,000 below the deep poverty level.[vi] When accounting for the actual cost of living in New Jersey, a single parent with two children needs roughly $86,759 per year in order to meet their basic needs.[vii] Even excluding child care costs, a single parent with two children needs almost $63,000 per year, more than twice the federal poverty level for a family of three, to cover bills.[viii]

TANF Benefits Fall Far Below Deep Poverty Levels

New Jersey’s low TANF amount has little purchasing power in today’s economy, especially compared to when the program was created. Since 1998, New Jersey’s TANF grant has lost approximately 30 percent of its value.[ix] As a result, the assistance that a family receives each month — which used to cover the average cost of groceries with enough left over to help pay other bills and living expenses like rent — now barely covers the average cost for the month’s groceries.

New Jersey's TANF Benefits Have Lost 30 Percent of Their Value Since 1998

Without adjusting for inflation each year, families living in poverty receiving TANF cannot keep up with rising living costs to meet basic needs. Additionally, as this minimal support diminishes over time, the burden of the onerous and time-intensive application process makes it more likely that eligible families may never even apply.[x]

It’s Time to Provide Families with Enough Support to Build Their Futures

After nearly three decades, it’s time to finally update New Jersey’s TANF program so it’s a more effective safety net for families when they fall on hard times. While the program requires broader reforms to lower administrative barriers to access and eligibility, raising the grant amount is an easy and logical first step. The program’s current grant amounts are far too low, putting the health and well-being of low-income families at risk, and their ability to break the cycle of poverty out of their reach. The lack of financial assistance exacerbates housing insecurity, intensifies food insecurity, and limits access to essential health care services.[xi] Consequently, children growing up in poverty face greater challenges in school, hindering their prospects for a prosperous future and perpetuating intergenerational cycles of poverty.[xii]

In confronting the harms of deep poverty as costs continue to rise, policymakers must recognize the urgency of updating the state’s TANF program: Each day of delay for families can make a life-changing difference. By increasing the TANF grant amount, New Jersey can reaffirm its commitment to a stronger and fairer society where families have the resources necessary to overcome financial hardship and build a stable future.


End Notes

[i] While this report focuses on TANF monthly grant levels and how they are insufficient in helping families escape deep poverty, there are numerous administrative reforms needed to reduce barriers to assistance and eligibility. These include smoothing the off-ramps so that individuals do not face such steep cliffs for assistance, lowering administrative barriers to applications and documentation for the program, improving eligibility levels to better match today’s economic realities, and more. These reforms are further discussed in New Jersey Policy Perspective’s 2020 report, Promoting Equal Opportunities for Children Living in Poverty, https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/promoting-equal-opportunities-for-children-living-in-poverty/, as well as in testimony provided by New Jersey Policy Perspective to the New Jersey Legislature. These testimonies can be found on the NJPP website, such as: https://www.njpp.org/publications/testimony/its-time-for-new-jersey-to-fix-workfirst-nj-to-better-support-low-income-families/

[ii] Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Economic Security Programs Help Low-Income Children Succeed Over Long Term, Many Studies Find, 2017. https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/economic-security-programs-help-low-income-children-succeed-over

[iii] Rutgers University – New Jersey State Policy Lab and the Center for Women and Work, Who Experienced the Greatest Financial Burden from Inflation in New Jersey? An Examination of Spending, Earnings, and Employment, 2023. https://policylab.rutgers.edu/report-release-who-experienced-the-greatest-financial-burden-from-inflation-in-nj/

[iv] UC Davis Center for Poverty & Inequality Research, What is “Deep Poverty”?, 2022. https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-deep-poverty; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Priorities, Chart Book: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) at 26, 2022. https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/temporary-assistance-for-needy-families-tanf-at-26

[v] NJPP Analysis of data in Attachment B of: New Jersey Department of Human Services — Division of Family Development, New Jersey State Plan for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), FFY 2021-FFY 2023, 2020. https://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dfd/programs/workfirstnj/tanf_2021_23_st_plan.pdf

[vi] NJPP Analysis of Attachment B of: New Jersey Department of Human Services — Division of Family Development, New Jersey State Plan for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), FFY 2024-FFY 2026, 2023. https://www.nj.gov/humanservices/providers/grants/public/publicnoticefiles/Draft%20New%20Jersey%20State%20Plan%20for%20Temporary%20Assistance%20for%20Needy%20Families%20(TANF)%20FFY%202024%20-%20FFY%202026.pdf; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2023 Federal Poverty Level Guidelines, https://aspe.hhs.gov/topics/poverty-economic-mobility/poverty-guidelines

[vii] It is important to note that this assumes approximately the same costs for the goods and services in terms of their portion of the bills since the original report, as it is only updated to account for inflation. Note that the pandemic led to a significant increase in prices and, for some services and goods, a significant change that far outpaced that of inflation. This means that these true poverty level estimates are likely conservative estimates. Sources for calculation: NJPP Analysis of Legal Services of New Jersey, True Poverty: What It Takes to Avoid Poverty and Deprivation in the Garden State, 2021, pg. 23. https://proxy.lsnj.org/rcenter/GetPublicDocument/00b5ccde-9b51-48de-abe3-55dd767a685a; Legal Services of New Jersey, New Jersey True Poverty Tracker: A Poverty Benchmarks Report Series, 2022. https://proxy.lsnj.org/rcenter/GetPublicDocument/380358ae-ad82-43a2-8e35-cd243030dbbc.

[viii] NJPP Analysis of data from the Federal Poverty Levels (https://aspe.hhs.gov/topics/poverty-economic-mobility/poverty-guidelines) and Legal Services of New Jersey, True Poverty: What It Takes to Avoid Poverty and Deprivation in the Garden State, 2021, pg. 28. https://proxy.lsnj.org/rcenter/GetPublicDocument/00b5ccde-9b51-48de-abe3-55dd767a685a

[ix] NJPP Analysis of New Jersey state budgets and Department of Human Services report on grant amounts and inflation rates.

[x] Urban Institute, Few Families Receive the TANF Cash Assistance They’re Eligible For, 2023. https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/few-families-receive-tanf-cash-assistance-theyre-eligible

[xi] There are numerous studies and reports showing the connections between poverty and various outcomes, as well as how the effects of each issue are intertwined. See for example: Institute for Research on Poverty, Unaffordable America: Poverty, Housing, And Eviction, 2015. https://www.irp.wisc.edu/resource/unaffordable-america-poverty-housing-and-eviction/; Feeding America, Food Insecurity among Overall (all ages) Population in New Jersey, 2023. https://map.feedingamerica.org/county/2021/overall/new-jersey; Health Affairs, Health, Income, & Poverty: Where We Are & What Could Help, 2018. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20180817.901935/; Health Affairs, Economic Well-Being And Health: The Role Of Income Support Programs In Promoting Health And Advancing Health Equity, 2022. https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2022.00846; New Jersey Hospital Association, New Jersey’s Most Vulnerable Communities: A Zip Code Analysis of Social Gaps and Their Impact on Health, 2019. https://www.njha.com/media/578105/CHART-NJ-Most-Vulnerable-Communities.pdf; Center for Budget and Policy Priorites, Chart Book: Housing and Health Problems Are Intertwined. So Are Their Solutions, 2022. https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/housing-and-health-problems-are-intertwined-so-are-their-solutions

[xii] For a summary of these effects, please see: The Center for Law and Social Policy, The Enduring Effects of Childhood Poverty, 2023. https://www.clasp.org/blog/the-enduring-effects-of-childhood-poverty/

Very Big, Very Few, and Far Away: Majority of Companies That Would Pay the Corporate Transit Fee Are From Out-of-State

New Jersey’s economy relies on NJ Transit to move millions of residents to their jobs, schools, doctor’s appointments, and grocery stores. However, after decades of disinvestment and with federal pandemic aid about to expire, NJ Transit faces a nearly $800 million shortfall, even after the agency approved a 15 percent fare hike earlier this year.[i] To fully cover the budget deficit and get NJ Transit’s finances back on track, Governor Murphy has proposed the first-ever dedicated source of funding for the agency: a Corporate Transit Fee on the biggest and most profitable corporations in the world, the overwhelming majority of which are headquartered outside of New Jersey.[ii]

The proposed Corporate Transit Fee would generate approximately $1 billion in revenue and only apply to corporations with net profits exceeding $10 million, representing less than 1 percent of all corporate taxpayers in New Jersey.[iii] Because the tax applies to profits made in New Jersey and not just companies located in the state, more than 4 out of 5 of the corporations that would pay the fee are out-of-state and multinational companies.

Despite claims from corporate lobbyists that this fee could hurt New Jersey businesses, the state’s recent history suggests otherwise. Over the last six years, the same companies targeted by the 2.5 percent fee were already paying the same tax rate under the now-expired Corporation Business Tax surcharge, and they made record-breaking profits when the surcharge was in effect while tax revenues increased accordingly.

With the future of NJ Transit on the line, the Corporate Transit Fee would save the agency and ensure that the most profitable corporations in the world contribute their fair share to critical infrastructure that provides as many benefits to these companies as it does to the public.

The Corporate Transit Fee Targets the Top 1 Percent of Corporations

The Corporate Transit Fee is highly targeted to the most profitable corporations with the highest ability to pay. Out of more than 116,000 corporate filers in the state, the Corporate Transit Fee would only apply to approximately 600 companies, the top 0.5 percent.[iv] The fee would not apply to New Jersey’s mom-and-pop businesses, or even most of the state’s corporations, as more than 99 percent of corporate filers would not pay it.

With corporate profits skyrocketing and large multinational companies concentrating enormous wealth and power, the Corporate Transit Fee would help level the playing field by making the tax code more progressive. Currently, corporate filers in New Jersey pay the same tax rate whether they have $100,000 in annual profit or more than $100 million.[v] This holds New Jersey’s small, midsize, and even large corporations to the same standard as corporate behemoths like Amazon, Walmart, and Bank of America.

The Majority of Companies That Would Pay Are From Out-of-State

Business lobbyists often portray the Corporate Transit Fee as a tax exclusively on New Jersey companies, but the data tells a different story. Among the roughly 600 corporations that would pay the Corporate Transit Fee, more than 4 out of 5 — 81 percent — are headquartered outside New Jersey.[vi] This is a result of the fee’s design, its high annual profit threshold of $10 million, and broader economic realities like increasing corporate concentration and the proliferation of online shopping.

Like other corporate taxes, the Corporate Transit Fee is based on profits generated in New Jersey, regardless of where a company is headquartered. This means that corporations can be subject to the fee even if they do not have any physical presence in the state or employees working here, undermining the already unsubstantiated claims made by business lobbyists that the fee makes the state less attractive to businesses.

New Jersey will continue to collect corporate tax revenue as long as multinational corporations and out-of-state businesses continue to profit from sales to New Jersey consumers. Whether it’s Amazon delivering packages, Tesla selling vehicles, or Adobe selling Photoshop, the Corporate Transit Fee won’t stop them from doing business in New Jersey.

Corporations Make Record Profits Even With Corporate Taxes

There’s no need to speculate about the potential impact of the Corporate Transit Fee on corporate profits or New Jersey’s business community. Over the last six years, corporate profits and corporate tax collections both skyrocketed in New Jersey with an almost identical tax in place: the 2.5 percent Corporation Business Tax surcharge on corporations with more than $1 million in annual profit. Between 2017 and 2023, corporate tax revenue in New Jersey more than tripled from $1.7 billion to over $5.3 billion.[vii] At the same time, corporate after-tax profits reached record levels.[viii] This evidence shows that a modest and targeted tax on the world’s most profitable corporations does not stop them from making record-breaking profits, nor does it impede state tax collections.

Since 2017, New Jersey’s corporate tax collections have not only been record highs for the state but also far outpaced comparable states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic. During that period, New Jersey’s corporate tax collections increased by 310 percent, almost triple that of neighboring Pennsylvania, a state with lower corporate tax rates that business lobbyists often point to in their efforts to lower their own tax obligations.[ix] The suggestion that reducing the corporate tax rate is beneficial to anyone but those corporations is simply unfounded, and New Jersey’s experience with the corporate surcharge shows that large corporations can remain ultra-profitable even while paying a modest tax on their profits.

The Corporate Transit Fee Makes Fiscal and Common Sense

 Requiring the most profitable corporations in the world to help fund the infrastructure they benefit from makes fiscal and common sense. Companies like Amazon, Coca-Cola, and Walmart continue to generate record-breaking profits and can easily afford to pay the Corporate Transit Fee without it hurting their bottom line, and having a reliable mass transit system is in the best interest of riders, the business community, and the broader economy. By targeting very big, very profitable, and mostly out-of-state corporations, the Corporate Transit Fee is a necessary step to save NJ Transit and improve service without once again balancing the agency’s budget on the backs of riders.


 End Notes

[i] New Jersey Transit Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes for March 12, 2024, Exhibit A, FY25 Operating Budget, p. 67426, https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/board/meeting_minutes/2024_03_12_OpenSess.pdf. The budget anticipates $766.8 million in Corporate Transit Fee revenue to cover its shortfall from other revenue sources.

[ii] NJPP analysis of data from New Jersey Department of the Treasury.

[iii] Governor’s Budget in Brief FY25, p. 60.

[iv] NJPP analysis of data from New Jersey Department of the Treasury.

[v] N.J. Stat. 54:10A-5(c)(1). For a plain English explanation, see NJ Division of Taxation, Corporation Business Tax Overview, https://www.nj.gov/treasury/taxation/corp_over.shtml (2023).

[vi] New Jersey Office of Revenue and Economic Analysis review of tax year 2021 business registration data and reported headquarter address.

[vii] NJPP analysis of New Jersey state budgets for fiscal years 2011-25.

[viii] U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Corporate Profits After Tax (without IVA and CCAdj) [CP], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CP, May 3, 2024.

[ix] NJPP analysis of Federal Reserve state corporate income tax revenue data.

New Immigrants Drive Economic Growth in New Jersey

This report was co-authored by Anthony Capote, Senior Policy Analyst at the Immigration Research Initiative, and David Dyssegaard Kallick, Director of the Immigration Research Initiative.

New Jersey’s fundamental strength lies in the rich tapestry of people who call the Garden State home, reflecting a diverse range of cultures and backgrounds. Nearly one in four residents (2.2 million) are immigrants,[i] who play a pivotal role in shaping the state’s identity.

Immigrants bring a wealth of skills and talents that enrich New Jersey’s arts, cuisine, and entertainment, add to the intellectual achievements across various fields, and play essential roles in the private and public sectors. Across the state, immigrants make significant contributions to their local communities and the broader economy through their labor, entrepreneurial endeavors, and tax contributions.

Despite the positive role immigrants play in New Jersey and around the country, there has been a rise in xenophobia and anti-immigrant policymaking in a number of states. It is imperative for New Jersey to uphold its values of inclusivity and support for immigrants. Championing “Fair and Welcoming” policies that lower barriers to essential public services and protect residents from discrimination and workplace abuses is not just a moral obligation but a strategic necessity for bolstering the state’s economy.

To measure the economic contributions of new immigrants, this research brief by New Jersey Policy Perspective and the Immigration Research Initiative models the long-term economic outcomes for newly arrived immigrants and projects that there will be significant wage earnings and tax contributions in their first year of arrival and even more over the long run.

Newly Arriving Immigrants Immediately Get to Work and Contribute to the Economy

Newly arriving immigrants face multiple challenges as they navigate language barriers, adapt to unfamiliar cultures and systems, and adjust to a new way of life. Despite these challenges, many swiftly integrate into the workforce within their first year. As a result, each 1,000 new immigrants can be expected to earn a combined $21 million in annual wages, enhancing the economic vitality of their communities where they work and amplifying local spending power where they live. After five years, the same 1,000 immigrants can be expected to increase their wages by about 57 percent, totaling $33 million in aggregate wages.

New Immigrants Work and Pay Taxes - Table outlining the aggregate wages and state/local taxes paid per 1,000 during the first year and after 5 years.

As immigrants settle in and establish their roots in New Jersey, state and local tax revenues see an uptick. For every 1,000 workers, state and local tax revenues are poised to increase by $1.8 million. Over the span of approximately five years, each 1,000 newly arrived immigrants collectively add to state and local tax revenues a total of $2.9 million, a 61 percent increase from their initial year. Such increases in state and local tax revenues translate into broader benefits for all residents, providing additional funding for schools, libraries, transit infrastructure, and other public goods.

However, more work remains to be done at the federal level to reduce barriers to work authorization for newly arriving immigrants. Earnings and tax contributions are contingent upon pathways to work authorization, and for those unable to gain work authorization, the trajectory toward upward mobility is much more limited.

Supporting Immigrants Makes New Jersey Stronger and Fairer for All

New Jersey’s commitment to inclusivity and fairness is evident through past policies that extend vital resources such as driver’s licenses, health care for all kids, language services, and pandemic relief to all, regardless of their immigration status. As a state built on diversity and resilience, it is critical to reaffirm this commitment as a beacon of hope for those fleeing persecution and seeking refuge.

Lawmakers must translate these values into tangible action, aligning state policies with equity and hospitality by improving immigrants’ wages and lowering barriers to health care, legal services, quality education, affordable housing, and more. By doing so, New Jersey can be a stronger and fairer state where everyone is valued, protected, and given a chance to thrive.


End Notes

[i] 2022 American Community Survey data, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data.html.


Methodology

To model the likely outcomes for new arrivals, IRI looked at immigrants in New Jersey who had been in the country for less than two years, and who do not speak English very well.

To model the outcome for those who have been here for approximately five years, we expanded the analysis to include those who speak English “very well,” but did not include those who speak “only English” at home, reflecting the fact that most — though not all — immigrants learn to speak the language very well within five years. We did not include in the analysis people who speak “only English” at home. To get a robust sample size, IRI looked at two years for new arrivals and five to ten years for those who have been here longer.

The tax analysis is based on a simple use of the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy report, “Who Pays: A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States.” According to the most recent, 7th Edition, the bottom 20 percent of tax filers in New Jersey pay 8.8 percent of their income in state and local taxes. We use this as the effective tax rate for newly arriving immigrants as well as for those who have been here for five years.

Many, but not all, of the workers would have work authorization. Many newly arriving immigrants are eligible to apply for Temporary Protected Status, humanitarian parole, asylum, or other designations that give them temporary or permanent work permits. The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy’s related report, “Undocumented Immigrants’ State and Local Tax Contributions,” shows that immigrants without work authorization pay an effective tax rate of 7.7 percent in New Jersey, a little lower than those with work authorization. The overall tax estimate might be increased by some families with incomes on the higher range, and decreased some by the proportion of immigrants who are undocumented.

About the Authors

Marleina Ubel is a senior policy analyst at New Jersey Policy Perspective.

Anthony Capote is a senior policy analyst at the Immigration Research Initiative.

David Dyssegaard Kallick is director of the Immigration Research Initiative.

Evaluating Governor Murphy’s Budget Proposal for Fiscal Year 2025

With tax collections lower than projected and federal pandemic aid expiring, Governor Murphy found a way to maintain funding for New Jersey’s long-standing obligations and essential public services in his latest state budget proposal. At the center of the budget is a new tax targeted to the most profitable corporations to provide NJ Transit with its first-ever dedicated source of funding. The budget also includes another full pension payment and additional funding for public schools, health care, and affordable housing, in line with the governor’s vision for a stronger, fairer, and more affordable New Jersey.

However, while the governor’s proposal seemingly avoids dramatic cuts, the budget spends more than the state is projected to collect in revenue. This structural deficit, combined with a reduction in the state’s surplus, as well as NJ Transit’s intent to move forward with a double-digit fare increase, are clear signs that more revenue is needed beyond the new Corporate Transit Fee. There is also much that remains unknown about budget specifics — including the newly proposed Retire Ready NJ program, the future of costly property tax credit programs like StayNJ, and potential programmatic cuts — that will not be revealed until the full budget document becomes available.

Now that Governor Murphy has delivered his budget address for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, here’s how it stacks up with the key benchmarks and priorities that NJPP identified last month.

Overall Fiscal Health

Bring Back the Corporate Surcharge on Big Businesses
Partially Included

Targeting corporations with more than $10 million in net profits, the newly proposed Corporate Transit Fee will go a long way to ensure that large multinational corporations pay for the infrastructure that helps fuel their success. The new 2.5 percent tax should generate more than $800 million in revenue from approximately 600 corporate filers, including the world’s most profitable businesses like Amazon and Walmart. Unlike the Corporate Business Tax surcharge, the tax would be permanent with no sunset date. To make up for revenue lost from the expiration of the original corporate surcharge, the new Corporate Transit Fee would be retroactive to January 1, 2024. This proposal, while historic, would raise additional revenue if it applied to corporations with at least $1 million in annual profits, as the original corporate surcharge did.

Fully Fund Pensions and Schools
Included

This budget marks the first time that the state has fully funded both its pensions obligation and school funding formula – a monumental achievement worth celebrating. After decades of lawmakers kicking the can down the road, Governor Murphy remained steadfast in his commitment to fix the state’s finances and fund its two biggest obligations, a move that will reflect well with credit rating agencies. However, despite fully funding the formula, many school districts will see less funding than the year prior, and the school funding formula remains long overdue for a constitutionally mandated update as learning standards and costs have changed significantly since 2008 when the formula was first adopted.

Maintain a Healthy Surplus
Partially Included

As with the current state budget, the budget proposed by the governor would once again run a structural deficit, spending more than it collects in revenue. As a result, the surplus will shrink to $6.1 billion from more than $8 billion a year ago. While this surplus remains higher than those of prior administrations, it remains lower than the national average and leaves little cushion to keep state government running in the event of an economic downturn. 

Family Affordability

Expand and Improve Tax Credits for Working Families
Not Included

The Child Tax Credit (CTC) and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) remain funded at last year’s levels, without any expansion of eligibility or increase in benefit amounts for either program. Given the success of these programs in helping low- and moderate-income families keep up with rising costs, lawmakers should expand the CTC so children up to age 12 are eligible, as well as the EITC so taxpayers who file with an Individual Tax Identification Number (ITIN) can benefit.

Increase Benefits in WorkFirst NJ to Reduce Poverty
Not Included

WorkFirst NJ, the state’s anti-poverty cash assistance program for very low-income residents, saw no increase in funding and did not receive any mention in the governor’s address or preliminary budget documents. A budget focused on affordability for low-income residents must include expanding funding for this critical lifeline by increasing the monthly grant amount to today’s economic standards. For too long, the low benefit amount has left recipients in poverty and unable to meet the state’s high costs.

Health Care

Expand Affordable Health Insurance Options
Partially Included

The governor’s budget proposal includes $100 million in additional funding for Cover All Kids, which allows all children to enroll in state-subsidized health insurance through NJ FamilyCare, regardless of citizenship or immigration status. However, the preliminary budget documents do not specify whether this funding is simply to cover children enrolled in the existing program or whether it will fund the next phase of the program’s implementation. To ensure that no child is uninsured, the program must include coverage options for children who are not eligible for NJ FamilyCare and still excluded from the state health insurance marketplace.

Increase Outreach for NJ FamilyCare
Partially Included

The Budget-in-Brief references continued outreach for NJ FamilyCare through the Department of Human Services; however, no specific line item or funding amount is mentioned. Additional funding for outreach is needed to ensure families maintain continuous coverage instead of becoming uninsured.

Continue to Fund Harm Reduction Expansion
Included

Harm reduction services will receive the same level of state funding as last year, with roughly $12 million in additional funding provided through the opioid settlement fund. The opioid settlement fund includes proceeds from lawsuits against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and retailers for their role in opioid overdose deaths. These investments will allow the state to continue expanding harm reduction services to every corner of the state.

Environment and Transit

Fully Fund NJ Transit to Avoid Drastic Fare Hikes
Partially Included

The proposed Corporate Transit Fee will be dedicated to fund New Jersey Transit in Fiscal Year 2026 and beyond. Because the agency has never had dedicated funding, this revenue will stabilize an often volatile budget while allowing the agency to invest in the capital and operating expenses that would make its services more reliable and sustainable. However, even with this new revenue stream, the raids to the agency’s capital fund continue, and the agency is still moving forward with its proposed 15 percent fare increase set to begin on July 1, 2024. With a new source of dedicated funding, NJ Transit should reconsider this immediate, double-digit fare increase.

Use the Clean Energy Fund on Clean Energy
Not Included

The budget proposal continues the longstanding practice of raiding the Clean Energy Fund to pay for NJ Transit, though at a lower level than prior years ($70 million, compared to $82 million in FY 2023). The budget does not include language that ensures that any diversion to NJ Transit is restricted to use on transitioning to clean energy and thus help New Jersey reach its clean energy goals. If diversions continue, these funds should be restricted to clean energy initiatives within the agency, such as helping fund the electrification of NJ Transit’s bus fleet.

Criminal Legal System

Eliminate the Cost of Communication for People Incarcerated
Not Included

The budget does not include any funding to eliminate the cost of communication for people incarcerated in state facilities. Currently, people who are incarcerated must pay private contractors for phone and video calls, and even short conversations can cost more than a day’s pay. For a relatively low cost to the state at roughly $10 million, lawmakers could follow in the footsteps of other states and alleviate this burden on people in incarceration and their loved ones.

Getting Back on Track: Fully Fund NJ Transit by Taxing Big Corporations

Every day, hundreds of thousands of New Jersey residents rely on public transit to get around, taking trips to work, school, medical appointments, family visits, and to shop and dine. NJ Transit is at the heart of these daily journeys, helping more than 630,000 people statewide go where they need to be while keeping cars off the road and bringing the state closer to its climate and pollution reduction goals.[i] NJ Transit is an engine of economic opportunity and everyday necessity, particularly for people who do not own or drive a car, as well as low-income, Black, and Hispanic/Latinx residents who are more likely to use mass transit.

However, the agency’s future is in jeopardy due to years of underfunding, the lack of a stable and dedicated source of revenue, and a looming deficit of nearly $1 billion once federal pandemic assistance expires.[ii] This deficit would constitute nearly one-third of the system’s total budget and, without additional state funding, could lead to dramatic service cuts and fare hikes that would harm everyday commuters and the broader economy.[iii]

Instead of relying on service cuts and fare hikes, state lawmakers should consider an alternative: have the largest and most profitable corporations help fund NJ Transit, a public service they directly benefit from, by simply extending the Corporation Business Tax surcharge on companies making more than $1 million in profit. The surcharge is only paid by the top 2 percent of corporations earning profits in New Jersey — including many large multinational companies headquartered outside of the state like Amazon and Walmart — providing a fair and stable revenue source that spares small businesses and commuters.[iv] This tax generates $1 billion in revenue annually, filling almost precisely the budget hole left by expiring federal funds and years of state disinvestment.[v]

As corporations earn record-breaking profits and working families struggle with rising prices, taxing multinational corporations to support critical infrastructure that we all benefit from is a fair, responsible, and commonsense solution to fix NJ Transit in the short and long term.[vi]

NJ Transit is Vital to New Jersey’s Economy and Communities

Serving the densest state in the nation and providing direct access to New York City and Philadelphia, NJ Transit connects residents to millions of employment and economic opportunities, essential services, community resources, entertainment, and social activities. Being able to get around safely and reliably, and having transportation options for residents who do not or cannot drive, is vital to the region’s economy and the wellness of communities across New Jersey. A robust mass transit system also supports better health outcomes by significantly reducing trips made by car — an essential service given that transportation is the single largest source of air pollution in the state.

Mobility and Accessibility

Everyone in New Jersey benefits from NJ Transit and the options they provide to get around the state. From the white-collar worker taking the train to their office, to the building maintenance worker taking the bus, to the nurse taking the light rail to get to their shift at the hospital, all types of workers depend on mass transit to provide for their families and keep the state running.

Mass transit is also a critical lifeline for low-income families and those who cannot drive or afford their own car. Nearly half of NJ Transit bus riders do not own a car, more than half have an annual income of less than $35,000, and 80 percent rely on the bus more than five times per week.[vii] The racial divide in commuting is also stark: Black workers are three times as likely as white workers to not have a car at home, while Hispanic/Latinx and Asian-American workers are twice as likely as white workers to not have a car.[viii] Further, households in cities with higher concentrations of people of color, like Jersey City and Newark, are more likely to lack access to a vehicle compared to households statewide.[ix] Mass transit ensures mobility and accessibility not only for these families but also for those who are disabled and cannot drive.

Economic Benefits

NJ Transit’s economic benefits build on the nearly 270 million individual trips made per year, connecting people within the state and beyond.[x] Bus and train rides link people with higher-paid jobs, health care facilities, and higher education opportunities.[xi] In addition to trips within the state, NJ Transit provides residents with direct access to New York City and Philadelphia, as well as connections to job centers across the Northeast Corridor in cities like Boston and Washington, DC. More than 78 million riders use NJ Transit-operated or supported trains and buses to travel into and out of Manhattan, with another 5.2 million riders going into and out of Philadelphia.[xii]

And these trips go beyond everyday commuting for work. A survey of bus riders found that 40 percent of riders use the bus to get to places other than their job, including doctor’s appointments, school, and to shop and dine.[xiii] This means that off-peak service is essential to keep the state’s economy moving. Hundreds of thousands of riders also travel down the shore on the North Jersey Coast Line and to concerts and events at stadiums and performing arts centers in Newark, the Meadowlands, and Atlantic City, attracting people from across the country and generating millions in income annually.[xiv]

Access to these job opportunities not only benefit individual workers and their families, but businesses and the broader economy alike. Businesses benefit from access to a deep and talented pool of workers, and will often move near job centers served by mass transit as a result. This creates a self-reinforcing loop, making states like New Jersey a great place to live and station a business.[xv]

Direct investments in NJ Transit also pay off for the state and the communities it serves. Roughly $5 billion is generated annually through spending on mass transit in the state, creating a return on an investment of two dollars in economic benefits for every dollar spent on NJ Transit.[xvi]

Health and Environment

Robust public transit also benefits the state by reducing air pollution and improving the health of New Jersey families and the environment. With New Jersey’s expansive highway and road networks, the transportation sector is the state’s biggest source of air pollution.[xvii] Replacing car trips with a bus or train helps reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions everywhere, particularly in communities overburdened by pollution. In 2019, NJ Transit displaced enough carbon dioxide to replace more than 800,000 passenger cars.[xviii] Increasing the use of public transportation will help New Jersey meet its goal of achieving an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.[xix]

More access to mass transit can also improve public health by reducing traffic congestion and injuries from car crashes. With fatal crashes and pedestrian fatalities on the rise, traffic safety should be viewed as a matter of public health. New Jersey has seen an increase in fatal crashes over the past two years, and road traffic crashes remain the leading cause of death for people under the age of 54 in the United States.[xx]

NJ Transit is Underfunded and Faces a Catastrophic Fiscal Cliff

Despite the crucial role of NJ Transit in morning commutes and the state’s economy, state lawmakers have routinely underfunded the agency over the last three decades. NJ Transit also lacks a dedicated and stable source of state funding, unlike comparable transit agencies across the country, making it near-impossible to balance annual budgets without forgoing capital improvements or raiding funds from other state programs. Now, with a one-time infusion of federal pandemic aid about to expire, NJ Transit faces a looming $1 billion budget shortfall that could lead to catastrophic service cuts and fare hikes.

Decades of Disinvestment

For decades, NJ Transit has not received enough state funding to cover its expenses, resulting in overcrowded buses, frequent train cancellations, and delays to much-needed service expansions like the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail. This underfunding is exemplified by the annual transfer of funding from NJ Transit’s capital budget — meant for updating and building new physical infrastructure — to cover annual operating costs, a practice that state lawmakers have allowed since 1990. Even so, lawmakers have historically provided NJ Transit with robust state funding until direct state aid was cut by 90 percent during the Christie administration.[xxi] As recently as 2009, the state invested $500 million annually in NJ Transit — far more than the $140 million direct state aid in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 budget.[xxii]

NJ Transit Receives Far Less Direct State Funding Than in Prior Decades

To cover its operating expenses, NJ Transit’s budget routinely raids hundreds of millions of dollars from other dedicated funds, most notably the Clean Energy Fund and NJ Transit’s own capital investment fund. Both raids are counterproductive: money from the Clean Energy Fund should support investments in new, green energy sources and technology, and raiding capital investments has left NJ Transit with more train breakdowns than its peer agencies.[xxiii]

Lack of state funding has also resulted in an overreliance on farebox revenue, i.e., commuter tickets and fares, a revenue source that is volatile year over year.[xxiv] Public transportation is a public service that benefits the state as a whole, not a “business” that should be expected to make a profit. Relying disproportionately on riders to balance NJ Transit’s budget functions as a regressive tax — shifting the financial burden on residents least able to afford it — and will never lead to a fully-funded, balanced budget.[xxv] Across the country, transit agencies more reliant on farebox revenue, including NJ Transit, are facing steeper budget shortfalls than agencies with stronger public investment.[xxvi]

 Reliance on Pandemic Aid

Already operating on a shaky foundation, NJ Transit and its finances were especially vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent dip in ridership. In the years since, lawmakers have balanced the agency’s budget with an infusion of federal pandemic assistance from the CARES Act and American Rescue Plan. In total, NJ Transit will have received approximately $4.5 billion in federal pandemic aid, including roughly $800 million for the current fiscal year and $750 million next year in FY 2025, after which the aid expires.[xxvii]

A look at NJ Transit’s current budget shows that the agency faces deficits of approximately $1 billion — nearly 30 percent of its budget — once the pandemic aid runs out.

NJ Trnasit Faces a Nearly $1 Billion Deficit When Federal Pandemic Aid Expires in FY 2026

As pandemic-related federal relief ends with no congressional action on the horizon, state lawmakers will have to grapple with a severely underfunded and overstretched agency that service cuts and fare hikes alone will not be able to solve.[xxviii]

Lack of Dedicated Funding 

NJ Transit is not alone in experiencing a drop in ridership after the pandemic; however, it remains the only statewide transportation agency of its kind without dedicated state funding.[xxix]

While comparable transit agencies receive more than half of their funding from dedicated state and local revenue sources, a mere 5 percent of NJ Transit’s budget comes from direct state aid. Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, California, and Illinois fund their mass transit systems through a statutorily dedicated portion of the sales tax.[xxx] New York and Oregon fund their transit systems with corporate and payroll taxes on businesses within their service areas.[xxxi]

NJ Transit Receives Only 5% of its Budget From Direct State Aid, Far Less Than Similar Agencies

Recently, New York resolved a $600 million deficit without drastic fare hikes or service cuts by raising taxes on corporations, many of which benefit from public transit.[xxxii] Not only is the agency fully funded and with a balanced budget for the first time in 20 years, but projections show that this new revenue stream will help balance MTA’s budget through 2027. Dedicated revenue allows agencies to sustain operations in the short term as well as engage in long-term planning to ensure continued high-quality service for riders everywhere.

Recommendation: Dedicate the Corporate Surcharge to Fund NJ Transit

To balance NJ Transit’s budget and put the agency on a path of long-term stability, any dedicated revenue must be substantial enough to cover the nearly $1 billion deficit and protect against future crises and shocks. New funding should also come from those with the highest incomes and wealth rather than the low-income residents for whom fares already serve as a de facto tax.[xxxiii] By simply extending the Corporation Business Tax surcharge, New Jersey can save NJ Transit with revenue generated by the world’s biggest and wealthiest corporations that have long benefited from the state’s infrastructure and workforce.  

A Fair Source of Revenue

 With many families struggling to keep up with rising costs, corporate profits have soared to record levels.[xxxiv] This concentration of wealth and resources has not only failed to trickle down to workers and their families, but has also coincided with significant corporate tax cuts at the state and federal levels. Most notably, the Trump-era tax cuts lowered the federal corporate tax rate to its lowest level since 1946.[xxxv] Tax avoidance is also on the rise, even with these lower tax rates, with more than one-third of large corporations paying nothing in taxes.[xxxvi] Having profitable corporations that directly benefit from public transit help pay for those investments would promote fairness, spare low- and middle-income riders from drastic fare increases, and provide NJ Transit with a stable source of revenue now and into the future.

And when states have cut corporate tax rates, the promised economic boom times rarely reach workers, with corporate tax rates having little correlation with income growth.[xxxvii] What corporate tax cuts do correlate with is rising inequality, with lower corporate taxes leading to more concentration of wealth in the top 1 percent of households.

When corporations pay a state tax, the dollars come from shareholders and highly paid executives, not average workers or consumers.[xxxviii]

Dedicating the CBT Surcharge

 New Jersey has already recognized how taxing highly profitable corporations can advance equity, fiscal responsibility, and smart economic investments. Enacted in 2018, the Corporation Business Tax (CBT) surcharge is a 2.5 percent tax on corporations with over $1 million in annual profits. This $1 billion revenue source targets the most profitable corporations in the world, but it is set to expire at the end of 2023 unless lawmakers extend it.

Because this tax is applied to profits, not revenue, the few affected corporations would remain incredibly profitable. And because the tax is applied to profits earned in New Jersey, not solely on companies headquartered in the state, it is primarily paid by large multinational corporations — like Amazon, Walmart, and Bank of America — that have no incentive to stop doing business in New Jersey. The $1 million profit threshold ensures that only the most profitable 2 percent of corporations operating in the state will pay it, meaning that 98 percent of New Jersey businesses will not pay the surcharge at all.[xxxix] And since the surcharge has been a part of New Jersey’s tax code since 2018, extending it would not create a new tax or expense for the roughly 2,500 corporations that currently pay it.

Dedicating the Corporate Surcharge to NJ Transit Would Solve the Budget Shortfall

To fix NJ Transit and give it the financial resources it needs to thrive in the coming decades, lawmakers should dedicate revenue from the CBT surcharge to pay for NJ Transit operations. The surcharge is estimated to bring in $1 billion in annual revenue, according to budget documents released by the Murphy administration, just as NJ Transit faces a nearly $1 billion budget deficit.[xl] A dedication of corporate surcharge funds will allow the agency to reduce its reliance on money from its capital fund and the Clean Energy Fund, allowing those dollars to go to their intended uses rather than patching over the system’s operations.[xli]

It is worth noting that NJ Transit is not the only agency or piece of state infrastructure that will require additional funding once federal pandemic assistance expires. Local school districts and child care providers, for example, are just two critical sectors that will need state investment to replace expiring federal aid.[xlii]

If state lawmakers do not want to use the entire CBT surcharge on transit so they have additional funding for other programs, they should dedicate at least $500 million to NJ Transit to bring state aid back to historical levels prior to the Christie administration. When adjusted for inflation, state investment in NJ Transit averaged over $400 million in annual spending during the 1980s, early 1990s, and during the pre-recession 2000s.[xliii] To be clear, this would not fully resolve NJ Transit’s budget deficit, but it would likely stave off the most disastrous cuts and fare hikes — if combined with other funding measures — while providing lawmakers time to find alternative funding sources.

Whichever path lawmakers choose, extending a tax on wealthy corporations to stabilize and fund NJ Transit can alleviate its fiscal woes and advance New Jersey’s economic and environmental goals, without pushing those costs onto low-income residents.

The Alternative is a Disaster

 If lawmakers do not find a new, dedicated source of revenue for NJ Transit, the alternative is nothing short of a disaster. Given the scale of NJ Transit’s budget deficit, balancing the agency’s budget primarily through fare hikes and service cuts could lead to a transit “death spiral,” a vicious cycle in which higher fares and reduced service lead to fewer riders, less revenue, and further cuts.[xliv] This would gut what remains of NJ Transit’s ridership base, jeopardizing the state’s economic growth, cutting off access to jobs from hundreds of thousands of residents, and dooming any progress towards the state’s climate and emission reduction goals. It shouldn’t have taken a crisis for lawmakers to finally dedicate funding to NJ Transit, but with a nearly $1 billion shortfall and no good alternative, they have no choice but to act.

 


End Notes

[i] NJ Transit averaged 637,100 rides on weekdays in the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2023. See Appendix A, NJ Transit Minutes for April 19, 2023, https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/board/meeting_minutes/2023_04_19_OpenSessEXP.pdf.

[ii] The nearly $1 billion in NJ Transit deficits can be seen in Appendix D of the NJ Transit Minutes for April 19, 2023, https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/board/meeting_minutes/2023_04_19_OpenSessEXP.pdf at exh. B, app’x D, p. 64876.

[iii] John Reitmeyer, NJ Transit Fare Hikes: Only a matter of time? NJ Spotlight News, Aug. 21, 2023, https://www.njspotlightnews.org/2023/08/nj-transit-money-woes-make-fare-hikes-service-cuts-possible/. The overall budget of NJ Transit for FY 2026 is approximately $3 billion. See Appendix D of the NJ Transit Minutes for April 19, 2023, https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/board/meeting_minutes/2023_04_19_OpenSessEXP.pdf at exh. B, app’x D, p. 64876.

[iv] N.J. Stat. 54:10A-5.41 (2023).

[v] The nearly $1 billion in NJ Transit deficits can be seen in Appendix D of the NJ Transit Minutes for April 19, 2023, https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/board/meeting_minutes/2023_04_19_OpenSessEXP.pdf at exh. B, app’x D, p. 64876.

[vi] Governor’s FY 2024 Budget in Brief, https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/omb/publications/24bib/BIB.pdf at p. 65.

[vii] New Jersey Transit, NJ Transit Sustainability Plan 2023: Draft (2023) at p. 19 https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/sustainability/NJ%20TRANSIT%20Sustainability%20Plan_DRAFT_05312023.pdf

[viii] National Equity Atlas, Car Access: New Jersey 2020, Percent of households without a vehicle by race/ethnicity, https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Car_access?geo=02000000000034000 (last accessed Sept. 21, 2023). See generally Demos, To Move Is To Thrive: Public Transit and Economic Opportunity for People of Color, Algernon Austin, November 15, 2017. https://www.demos.org/research/move-thrive-public-transit-and-economic-opportunity-people-color

[ix] See National Equity Atlas, Car Access: New Jersey vs. Newark, NJ, 2020, Percent of households without a vehicle by race/ethnicity, https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Car_access?geo_compare=07000000003451000&geo=02000000000034000 (last accessed Sept. 21, 2023); National Equity Atlas, Car Access: New Jersey vs. Jersey City, NJ, 2020, Percent of households without a vehicle by race/ethnicity, https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Car_access?geo_compare=07000000003436000&geo=02000000000034000 (last accessed Sept. 21, 2023).

[x] New Jersey Transit, About Us, last accessed Sept. 17, 2023, https://www.njtransit.com/about/about-us.

[xi] See Jon Carnegie, Deva Deka & Andrea Lubin, Marketing Research for the Quantifiable Benefits of Transit in New Jersey, New Jersey Dep’t of Transportation Bureau of Research Paper No. FHWA-NJ-2021-006, https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/61821 at 35.

[xii] Jon Carnegie, Deva Deka & Andrea Lubin, Marketing Research for the Quantifiable Benefits of Transit in New Jersey, New Jersey Dep’t of Transportation Bureau of Research Paper No. FHWA-NJ-2021-006, https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/61821 at 3.

[xiii] https://tstc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Bus-Survey-Results-Report.pdf

[xiv] Jon Carnegie, Deva Deka & Andrea Lubin, Marketing Research for the Quantifiable Benefits of Transit in New Jersey, New Jersey Dep’t of Transportation Bureau of Research Paper No. FHWA-NJ-2021-006, https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/61821 at 36.

[xv] Siqi Zheng, MIT Climate Portal, Explainer: Public Transportation, Feb. 21, 2023, https://climate.mit.edu/explainers/public-transportation.

[xvi] See Jon Carnegie, Deva Deka & Andrea Lubin, Marketing Research for the Quantifiable Benefits of Transit in New Jersey, New Jersey Dep’t of Transportation Bureau of Research Paper No. FHWA-NJ-2021-006, https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/61821 at 2.

[xvii] A recent federal estimate puts the transportation sector at 47.9% of New Jersey’s carbon emissions. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Table 3: State Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Sector, 2021, July 12, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/excel/table3.xlsx.

[xviii] Analysis of NJ Transit Draft Sustainability Plan, p. 6. https://content.njtransit.com/sites/default/files/sustainability/NJ%20TRANSIT%20Sustainability%20Plan_DRAFT_05312023.pdf. Analysis done using NJ Transit carbon impact and US EPA greenhouse gas equivalencies calculator. Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator (July 2023), https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator

[xix] New Jersey Dep’t of Environmental Protection, New Jersey’s Global Warming Response Act 80×50 report, p. v, https://dep.nj.gov/wp-content/uploads/climatechange/nj-gwra-80×50-report-2020.pdf.

[xx]New Jersey State Police Fatal Accident Investigation Unit, Fatal Motor Vehicle Crash Comparative Data Report for the State of New Jersey, p. 2 (2022) https://nj.gov/njsp/information/pdf/fcr/2021_fatal_crash_report.pdf; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Road Traffic Injuries and Deaths – A Global Problem, Jan. 10, 2023,  https://www.cdc.gov/injury/features/global-road-safety/index.html.

[xxi] Emma G. Fitzimmons & Patrick McGeehan, New Jersey Transit, a Cautionary Tale of Neglect, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/nyregion/new-jersey-transit-crisis.html

[xxii] NJPP analysis of NJ budget documents from FY 1985 to present.

[xxiii] See Alex Ambrose, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Stop the Raids: The Clean Energy Fund Should Fund Clean Energy, Jan. 12, 2023, https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/stop-the-raids-the-clean-energy-fund-should-fund-clean-energy/. Elise Young, NJ Transit’s Creaky, Empty Trains Stir Worry of Fare Increases, Bloomberg, Feb. 24, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-24/nj-transit-delays-hit-record-high-despite-gov-murphy-pledge-to-fix-trains

On the capital-to-operating raid, the New Jersey Department of Transportation notes that because of underfunding, NJ Transit has to use capital funding for basic maintenance and operations, rather than on long-term purchasing of new trains, buses, and equipment. See Nikita Biryukov, No dedicated funding source for NJ Transit this year, budget chair says, New Jersey Monitor, May 4, 2023, https://newjerseymonitor.com/2023/05/04/no-dedicated-funding-source-for-nj-transit-this-year-budget-chair-says/.

[xxiv] Over the past two decades, farebox revenue has fluctuated from highs of over $1 billion to lows of $375 million during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

[xxv] Based on 2021 consumer expenditure data, the average household in the bottom 10 percent in income spent roughly 2.3% of income on public and other transportation, compared with a mere 0.5% in the top 10 percent. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Surveys, Table 1110, Deciles of income before taxes: Annual expenditure means, shares, standard errors, and coefficients of variation (2022). https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu-income-deciles-before-taxes-2021.pdf

[xxvi] The Metropolitan Transportation Authority has analyzed its finances and identified volatile farebox revenue as a prime driver of its fiscal risks. See Office of the State Deputy Comptroller for the City of New York, Fare Revenue Considerations for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (November 2022), https://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/osdc/fare-revenue-considerations-metropolitan-transportation-authority.

[xxvii] Governor’s Disaster Recovery Office, COVID-19 State Funding Financial Table, Responsible Agency: NJ Transit, last updated June 30, 2023, https://gdro.nj.gov/tp/en/financial-analysis/table-view/state?bureau=376369859&sortColumn=agency&sortValue=asc&pageSize=15&pageOffset=0&lang=en.

[xxviii] Transit agencies were fortunate that unexpended pandemic aid avoided the chopping block, as a target of House Republican cuts to federal aid nationally. See Ian Duncan & Justin George, Ailing Transit Agencies to Keep Pandemic Funding in Debt Ceiling Deal, Washington Post, June 2, 2023 https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2023/06/02/covid-aid-transit-debt-ceiling/.

[xxix] American Public Transportation Association, Policy Brief: Public Transit Agencies Face Severe Fiscal Cliff, June 2023, p. 2 https://www.apta.com/wp-content/uploads/APTA-Survey-Brief-Fiscal-Cliff-June-2023.pdf

[xxx] Pennsylvania deposits 4.4% of sales tax into its Public Transportation Trust Fund. See Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Fiscal Year 2024 Operating Budget, Fiscal 2025-2029, Financial Projections (2023), https://planning.septa.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/FY2024-Operating-Budget-Proposal-4.pdf, p. 80; Phineas Baxandall, Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center, How Slow Sales Tax Growth Causes Funding Problems for the MBTA, Jan. 10, 2018, https://www.massbudget.org/reports/pdf/MBTA%20Sales%20Tax%20Explainer%20FINAL%201-8-2018.pdf p. 1;  California has two separate dedicated funds for transit, one based on a quarter-cent of the general sales tax and a separate formula for state transit assistance, see Caltrans, Transportation Development Act, accessed Sept. 21, 2023, https://dot.ca.gov/programs/rail-and-mass-transportation/transportation-development-act; Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, Mass Transit District Sales Tax, accessed Sept. 21, 2023, https://tax.illinois.gov/localgovernments/masstransit.html.

[xxxi] Trimet, Payroll and Self-Employment Tax Information, Employer Payroll Tax, accessed Sept. 21, 2023, https://trimet.org/taxinfo/#employer

[xxxii] Metropolitan Transit Authority, MTA Announces Balanced Budget Through 2027 in July Financial Plan, July 17, 2023, https://new.mta.info/press-release/mta-announces-balanced-budget-through-2027-july-financial-plan.

[xxxiii] For an overview on how progressive taxes in which higher-income and higher-wealth residents pay a higher effective tax rate than their lower-income neighbors, see Carl Davis & Meg Wiehe, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Taxes and Racial Equity, Mar. 31, 2023, https://itep.org/taxes-and-racial-equity/. For the de facto tax imposed on low-income residents, see endnote 25 above.

[xxxiv] Corporate profits in Q2 2023 were 38 percent higher than they were in Q2 2019, at nearly $3.2 trillion. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National income: Corporate profits before tax (without IVA and CCAdj) [A053RC1Q027SBEA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A053RC1Q027SBEA, September 6, 2023.

[xxxv] Tax Policy Center, Historical Corporate Income Marginal Tax Rates, Tax Years 1942-2022, February 2022. https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/marginal-corporate-tax-rates

[xxxvi] Steve Wamhoff, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, GAO Report Confirms: Trump Tax Law Cut Corporate Taxes to Rock Bottom, Jan. 13, 2023, https://itep.org/government-accountability-office-report-confirms-trump-tax-law-cut-corporate-taxes-increased-corporations-paying-zero-taxes/

[xxxvii] Josh Bivens, Economic Policy Institute, Reclaiming Corporate Tax Revenues, April 14, 2022, https://www.epi.org/publication/reclaiming-corporate-tax-revenues/.

[xxxviii] William G. Gale & Samuel I. Thorpe, Brookings Institution, Rethinking the incidence of the corporate income tax, May 10, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rethinking-the-incidence-of-the-corporate-income-tax/.

[xxxix] Sheila Reynertson, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Stop the Sunset: Corporate Tax Cut Would Benefit the Biggest and Most Profitable Businesses (Feb. 22, 2023), https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/stop-the-sunset-corporate-tax-cut-would-benefit-the-biggest-and-most-profitable-businesses/

[xl] See Governor’s FY 2024 Budget in Brief (2023) https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/omb/publications/24bib/BIB.pdf at p. 65.

[xli] See Alex Ambrose, New Jersey Policy Perspective, Stop the Raids: The Clean Energy Fund Should Fund Clean Energy, Jan. 12, 2023, https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/stop-the-raids-the-clean-energy-fund-should-fund-clean-energy/. On the capital-to-operating raid, Transportation Commissioner Diane Gutierrez-Scaccetti notes that because of underfunding, NJ Transit has to use capital funding for basic maintenance and operations, rather than on long-term purchasing of new trains, buses, and equipment. See Nikita Biryukov, No dedicated funding source for NJ Transit this year, budget chair says, New Jersey Monitor, May 4, 2023, https://newjerseymonitor.com/2023/05/04/no-dedicated-funding-source-for-nj-transit-this-year-budget-chair-says/.

[xlii] See Peter Chen et al., New Jersey Policy Perspective, Red Flags Amid a Sea of Green: Breaking Down New Jersey’s FY 2024 Budget, Aug. 8, 2023, https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/red-flags-amid-a-sea-of-green-breaking-down-new-jerseys-fy-2024-budget/.

[xliii] See Chart 1 above.

[xliv] Colleen Wilson, NJ Transit has had many fiscal crises. Here’s why the one that’s looming will be worse, NorthJersey.com, Jul. 17, 2023, https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/transportation/2023/07/17/nj-transit-fare-increases-service-cuts-new-fiscal-crisis/70407492007/

Unlocking Academic Success: Revitalizing New Jersey’s School Funding Formula for Student Achievement

All students, regardless of their background, should have access to a high-quality education to help them reach their full potential. In the past few years, New Jersey has moved steadily toward fully funding its schools through the 2008 School Funding Reform Act (SFRA), the state’s school finance law. This landmark legislation requires funding alignment with student outcomes.

Since SFRA was enacted in 2009, however, New Jersey has raised student achievement expectations: state exams are more rigorous, and students are expected to meet higher standards. While there have been small changes in SFRA funding targets since its inception, the current law does not provide all the resources students need to reach these new standards because it is still aligned with outdated learning goals.

The state can fine-tune the formula by making small but significant tweaks. Specifically, the state can adjust the funding needed to adequately educate a student, which is called the base student amount, and align that with the additional costs for students who need extra help, like special education students, English language learners (ELL), and more, which are called weights for student characteristics. Other states have recently used updated and improved data and methods, and New Jersey can do the same.

History has shown — and we have documented in previous work — that systemic, institutional racism has fostered the segregative trends that led to the current concentration of low property values and high student need in many of New Jersey’s towns and cities.[1] Properly adjusting SFRA is, therefore, a matter of both racial justice and educational adequacy. This report explores what it means to fund our schools adequately and meet the constitutionality of SFRA, explains the school funding formula, and offers recommendations to fine-tune SFRA to ensure its constitutionality and that it better supports today’s students and their futures.

What is “Adequate” School Funding?

Research conclusively shows that school funding has a significant effect on student success.[2] At the same time, research also shows that different communities require different funding levels to provide equal educational opportunities for their students. But how much funding should be given to each district based on the unique needs of their student populations? Adequacy refers to the level of funding needed for a specific population of students to achieve a specific educational outcome. A school district with adequate funding has the resources to provide an education that allows its students to meet a specific goal: an average test score, a particular graduation rate, or some other measurable outcome.

Adequacy considers the characteristics of a school district’s students that affect their abilities to achieve learning outcomes. For instance, adequacy acknowledges that more revenue is needed when student poverty is more highly concentrated, or students have greater educational needs. Adequacy also accounts for differences in labor markets and other factors that drive up district costs to staff their schools properly. Finally, adequacy considers the rigor of the educational outcomes that students are expected to achieve. Put simply, meeting higher standards costs more than meeting lower standards.

Exactly how school funding positively affects outcomes continues to be studied; however, researchers have found compelling evidence that reductions in class size, more support and instructional staff, early childhood education, increases in instructional time, and more competitive wages for school staff benefit students.[3] All of these reforms are made possible when school funding is adequate and equitable.

New Jersey’s Constitutional Mandate for Adequately Funded Schools

The New Jersey Constitution requires that the Legislature “…provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools….” However, in a series of lawsuits throughout the last 50 years, including the Abbott decisions, the state Supreme Court found that the Legislature was still not meeting its obligations and demanded increased school funding. [4] In this context, the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 was enacted, a public education finance formula connecting school funding to the state’s broader adoption of academic content standards and performance assessments.

Even when the law passed — as pointed out in previous reports — the outcome standards and cost estimates used to set adequacy levels in SFRA were already several years old. [5] The general tone of the court suggested that SFRA looked like a reasonable effort to meet the standard it had laid out a decade earlier and that SFRA could be implemented — but only with certain conditions attached.

The court held:

To the extent that the record permitted in this review, SFRA is constitutional and may be applied in Abbott districts subject to the State continuing to provide school funding aid during this and the next two years at the levels required by SFRA’s formula each year, and subject further to the mandated review and retooling of the formula’s weights and other operative parts after three years of implementation.

– Abbott XX, 199 N.J. 140, May 2009. Emphasis ours.

In addition to the law requiring that the SFRA formula must be reviewed and, if necessary, recalibrated every three years, the court found SFRA is also only constitutional if it is fully funded. The court reaffirmed this point when funds were cut from Abbott districts in 2011.[6] Under the Murphy administration, the Legislature has moved closer to fully funding the current formula; this is an important step forward. However, SFRA must also be aligned with current standards and student outcome goals to remain constitutional.

Understanding the School Funding Formula (SFRA)

While it is well understood that schools need adequate funding, setting adequacy levels is a complex task. New Jersey’s School Funding Reform Act (SFRA) outlines a formula to set adequacy levels for all school districts. As noted in previous work, the SFRA formula needs updating to be constitutional and fix the significant underestimation of the adequacy level for many school districts.[7]

Fortunately, lawmakers don’t need to start from scratch; they need only follow the law and reset a few key components in the formula to ensure that all schools and their students receive adequate funding. But, to understand how the SFRA formula can be adjusted, we must first understand how it works. The formula uses a “weighted student enrollment” method that can be simplified into three basic steps:

Step 1: Set the “Base Amount”

In theory, the base amount determines the funding needed to adequately educate students in Grades 1 through 5, assuming they are not economically disadvantaged and speak English as their native language. If a school district only had these students and received the base amount per pupil — currently $12,451, as shown in the table below — it would, according to the SFRA formula, have the resources it needs to achieve the educational goals the state has set.

Step 2: Determine the “Weighted Student Enrollment”

The SFRA formula does more than count the number of students in a school district; it also tracks important student characteristics that increase costs, “weighting” students with those characteristics more heavily. For example, elementary school students are considered the baseline, and each are counted as 1.00 student, absent of all other factors. For every student who does not speak English as their native language — Limited English Proficient (LEP) — an additional 0.5 for each LEP student is counted in the weighted enrollment count. Also, students in poverty (as measured by their eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch) are weighted between 1.47 and 1.57 times more heavily in the enrollment count, depending on the concentration of poverty in their district. Further, high school students are weighted more heavily than elementary students and vocational tech students receive additional weights. The latest weights are listed in the table below.

Step 3: Multiply the Weighted Student Enrollment by the Base Amount

The total adequacy budget is the student enrollment, weighted by student characteristics, multiplied by the base amount (and further weighted by geographic cost adjustments).

To be clear: this is a simplified explanation of only one part of the SFRA formula. Other factors affect the final school aid calculation a district receives from the state, such as special education, categorical aid, local fair share, etc.

Understanding the steps above yields a key insight: The SFRA formula can be adjusted by changing the base amount and the weights used to determine weighted student enrollment. When the base and the weights are set correctly, the amount a district should spend to provide an adequate education is calculated accurately; when the base and weights are wrong, the adequacy budget calculation is wrong. Getting the base and the weights right is, therefore, critically important for maintaining the constitutionality of SFRA. By law, the base and weights must be adjusted every three years.

Current SFRA Adequacy: An Update

A previous NJPP report explains how the outcome standards required of New Jersey’s students over time have changed, becoming more demanding and requiring more intensive instruction.[8] Therefore, the current SFRA formula likely underestimates the funding schools need to achieve adequacy. In 2018, over 100,000 students were in schools that were severely underfunded — more than $5,000 per pupil less than SFRA’s targets. That number has been cut in half in recent years; however, many New Jersey children are still enrolled in underfunded schools as assessed by SFRA’s formula.

 

New Jersey’s New, More Rigorous Standards

To maintain constitutionality, adjustments to the SFRA formula must be linked to learning outcomes, especially if those outcomes have changed — which they have. In a previous report[9], we explained how the outcome standards required of New Jersey’s students over time have become more demanding and, therefore, require more intensive instruction. To illustrate this change, this report uses the best consistent measure for determining a state’s goals for student proficiency: the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP)[10], a national test considered the gold standard of student assessment.

Because the NAEP is designed to be a consistently challenging exam across time, it can compare the relative difficulty of achieving a proficient score on New Jersey’s state tests in different years — even if the tests and their definition of “proficient” change. As the graph below shows, the difficulty of New Jersey’s tests has increased considerably; a score considered “proficient” two decades ago would not be today.

In 2005, for example, the state’s assessment score on the NJASK, [11] the state’s standardized test, determined proficiency in 4th-grade reading to be statistically equivalent to a 191 NAEP score. This was when funding targets for SFRA were originally adjusted; however, it took another four years before the law was fully enacted. By then the proficiency standard in 4th-grade reading increased to a 221 NAEP-equivalent score.For more context on the state’s increase in school education standards, when the state changed its standardized test from the NJASK to PARCC in 2015,[12] the proficiency equivalent on the NAEP leapt up to 233. In 2019, the state again switched its test to the NJSLA;[13] the standards dropped slightly to a 225 NAEP score, still well above the original 2005 level. Other subjects and grade levels saw similar increases.

At the time of SFRA’s inception, methods for making these estimates, or “costing out” an adequate education, primarily revolved around making what are best described as educated guesses. Documented here and in previous work,[14] estimates were below what is needed to provide an adequate education, especially for schools serving large proportions of students experiencing economic disadvantage.

Fine-Tuning the Formula With Evidence

The SFRA formula can and should be fine-tuned with better data and methods. Recent examples from other states show New Jersey how the school funding formula can be improved to better estimate the costs of an adequate education. This is not only important to meet the needs of New Jersey students but also to comply with the state constitution, which calls for regular updating.

In the last several years, data collection and methods to analyze those data have improved significantly: policymakers have better access to data on student characteristics, area poverty, wage competitiveness, and other factors that affect educational costs than they had before. Cost estimates based on data analysis have the advantage of being based on actual spending and measurable student outcomes. Other states have taken advantage of these improvements to adjust their formulas and better estimate educational costs. Examples include:

  • Kansas: In 2017, Legislators contracted with independent researchers to estimate an updated cost model based on new outcome standards to revise their weighted foundation aid formula as ordered by the state courts. Kansas had used similar, rigorous statistical methods ahead of other states a decade earlier.[15]
  • Vermont: Legislators contracted the American Institutes for Research (AIR) in collaboration with the University of Vermont to use similar methods to guide reforms of their pupil need weights. While COVID slowed the process, in the spring of 2022, the Vermont legislature and governor adopted reforms to the weighting system guided by those findings.[16]
  • New Hampshire: In 2020, the New Hampshire Commission on School Funding worked with the same researchers to estimate models of the costs to achieve that state’s desired outcome goals but has not yet acted on the report findings.[17] (One of the authors of this brief, Dr. Bruce D. Baker, was part of the teams that performed the Vermont and New Hampshire analyses.)

 

Studies like these can be completed in under a year with lower expense and greater validity than other methods that estimate educational costs. They have the additional advantage of being able to be easily updated as new data is collected.

Adjusting SFRA: An Example

How might New Jersey use a data-informed approach to adjust SFRA? The state can use a data-informed approach that uses national datasets and modern cost-modeling methods. Over the past several years, for example, the authors of this brief have developed a National Education Cost Model (NECM), which is used in our national reporting on the adequacy and fairness of state school finance systems.[18] The model uses data on over 13,000 school districts per year over a decade to estimate the relationship between existing and past spending, district characteristics, student characteristics, and outcomes in reading and math. The resulting estimations allow us to set appropriate outcome goals and estimate the cost of attaining them for individual school districts.

We have used this model in earlier NJPP reports to evaluate the adequacy of SFRA concerning the costs of achieving different outcomes on state tests in English and math.[19] Importantly, we arrived at different estimations based on different outcome goals. The cost per pupil is relatively modest if we set a relatively low goal — for example, the national average outcomes on state tests. If we set a higher goal — say, average outcomes for Massachusetts students, the highest in the nation — the cost estimates are higher.

The table below shows estimates from the NECM with two outcomes goals, compared to a simulation of the SFRA adequacy budget’s funding targets. Standard 1 — the low standard — is the estimated cost of achieving national average outcomes of state tests. Standard 2 is higher: average Massachusetts outcomes. The estimates are broken down into five poverty levels, ranging from low to high.

If New Jersey were to set a low target for national average test scores, the SFRA, in its current form, would provide more than enough revenue to meet that goal, especially in lower-poverty districts. However, New Jersey is relatively high performing, surpassing national averages. If the state sets the higher goal of meeting Massachusetts’s average outcomes (again, the highest outcomes in the nation), only wealthier districts would have the revenues needed under SFRA to meet that goal. The highest-poverty districts would need more than $7,000 additional dollars per student to achieve this more rigorous standard.

It’s important to note that we are using Massachusetts outcomes as a benchmark because of their high average test scores; this does not mean, however, that New Jersey can simply spend as much as Massachusetts and achieve similar results. There are substantial differences between the two states in poverty and English Language Learner rates, labor costs, urban density, and other factors that affect school costs. Our models account for those differences, creating estimates of what funding levels are needed for New Jersey, with its unique characteristics, to attain Massachusetts’ outcomes.

The higher standard model where wealthier districts have adequate funding (and that middle-poverty districts are close) suggests that while the base amounts per pupil set is near or at the level it needs to be, the weighting for economically disadvantaged students is too low. Therefore, adjusting the weights is important for the state to move towards adequacy and fulfilling the constitutionality of SFRA.

Again, these estimates are based on actual fiscal and outcome data, not simply educated guesses. The models use methods other states have already employed to better calibrate their school funding formulas toward the goal of educational adequacy.  Of course, different outcome goals and different statistical models can and will yield different estimates. We explore these differences in the Technical Appendix.

Recommendation: Adjust SFRA With Input From School Finance Experts

New Jersey’s school funding law, SFRA, must be regularly adjusted to maintain its constitutionality. But it must be adjusted correctly, based on student outcome and fiscal data, valid methods, and rigorous yet achievable standards. Fortunately, other states have shown how the Legislature could proceed, using cost modeling approaches that yield estimates far more likely than previous ones to reflect the true cost of providing New Jersey’s students with an adequate education.

We recommend that the Legislature consider directing the Joint Committee on the Public Schools to hold hearings on SFRA’s adjustment. The Committee should hear from experts in the field of public school finance as to why recalibration is necessary, options for performing the recalibration, and the experiences of other states in reworking their school funding formulas. The final work product of the hearings should be a report (likely produced by contracted experts in school finance, as in other states) that estimates costs and sets SFRA base amounts and weights based on various scenarios and outcome goals.

Adjusting SFRA is necessary to retain its constitutionality and help ensure New Jersey’s students get the schooling they deserve. The Legislature should act now and begin the process of SFRA recalibration so all of New Jersey’s children have equal educational opportunities.


Technical Appendix

Over the past several years, we have developed a National Education Cost Model (NECM), which is used in our national reporting on the adequacy and fairness of state school finance systems.[20] Specifically, the current version of the model uses data on over 13,000 school districts per year from 2009 to 2019 to estimate the relationship between existing and past spending, district characteristics, student characteristics, and outcomes in reading and math to generate predictions of the spending needed to achieve specific outcome levels in each district.

In this appendix, we include additional estimates of costs derived from our national data sources and national model specification. Specifically, we provide estimates here to isolate New Jersey and neighboring states, running a regional cost model. In addition, we run a cost model using our national data, but on New Jersey districts alone. Our experience with the model has shown us that sometimes cost variations within regions and specific states differ from those in other regions of the United States. These differences may occur because of the geographic and demographic differences that exist from region to region and the fact that school districts tend to be organized differently from state to state and region to region.

Again, we set lower and higher standards for outcomes for which we predict per pupil costs for each district and compare against existing spending:

  • Standard 1 = National Average Outcomes
  • Standard 2 = Massachusetts Average Outcomes (National Model), New Jersey Average (Regional & State Models)

 

The table below summarizes our national cost model results, comparing cost predictions to alternative per-pupil spending measures and the budgeted adequacy calculation produced under SFRA. The most directly relevant spending figure is the U.S. Census Bureau’s current operating expense figure because that is the measure on which the model is estimated. The model compares spending to outcome measures, considering student and context measures to establish the relationships from which we predict the spending needed to achieve desired outcomes.

The New Jersey Department of Education budgetary per pupil cost measure is less inclusive than the Census Current Spending measure. But, for either the budgetary per pupil cost or current spending measure, we see that the lowest poverty 20% of districts spend marginally more than the highest poverty 20% of districts. That is, actual spending is “regressive” concerning poverty. This is even though predicted per pupil costs to achieve common outcomes are much higher in the highest poverty districts. Indeed, SFRA provides a higher adequacy budget for those districts, but not enough. And the “progressiveness” of SFRA adequacy budgets is insufficient to offset the regressiveness of what New Jersey school districts raise and spend. We can also see that where spending falls short of costs, outcomes fall short of targets.

The table below compares three models estimated for this brief to SFRA adequacy budgets for 2023, starting with the model estimates from the table above. We use our cost estimates from 2020, one year beyond the available outcome data. An interesting twist is that these cost estimates are slightly lower than those for 2019. This is because student outcomes in recent years have declined nationally, and our model finds logically that lower outcomes cost less to achieve. Our outcome targets are based on existing and historical averages here, nationally, and for Massachusetts and New Jersey.

By 2023, SFRA adequacy budgets have increased from the 2019 figures in the previous table. The highest poverty districts are, on average, at or near the per pupil costs to achieve national average outcomes. Recall that if we strive to achieve a specific outcome target, on average, about half of students will fall below that target and about 16% substantially below (as noted above, below average outcomes of low-income students in states like Alabama or Mississippi). On average, shooting for a higher target is necessary for meeting reasonable targets for those in the lower half of the distribution.

As with the comparison in the previous table: when compared against the higher target, adequacy budgets by 2023 approximate the cost target for the two lowest-poverty quintiles. However, adequate budgets for the two highest-poverty quintiles fall short of cost targets. The high outcome standard in the National and Regional model is the Massachusetts average, and in the New Jersey model is New Jersey’s average, similar to that of Massachusetts. Suppose we believe that the current state of average math and reading outcomes in New Jersey meets the constitutional standard of adequacy. In that case, this may be a reasonable starting point for calibration.

Recall that the differences in adequacy budgets under SFRA have been achieved through a series of pupil weightings or multipliers times a base level of funding. The latest Educational Adequacy Report (EAR) puts the formula weight at 0.5 for Limited English Proficient (LEP) students and 0.47 to 0.57 for Free and Reduced-Price Lunch students. This should mean that every LEP student in a district generates at least 1.5 times the base amount; in reality, however, the SFRA adequacy budget and the actual spending of districts are significantly less. The table below shows the “actual” weights that result from either our simulation of the SFRA adequacy budget or from spending as reported in the Taxpayers Guide to Educational Spending.

Below these are weights derived from our cost models. The Free Lunch weight for the model using Massachusetts mean outcomes as the goal is 1.2; the models suggest that the SFRA weight should be adjusted from about .5 to 1.2 if the goal is to achieve average Massachusetts outcomes on state tests. The LEP weight should be adjusted to 0.68 from 0.5.

 

End Notes


[1] Baker, B. D. and Weber, M.A. (2022) Separate and Unequal: Racial Segregation and the Case for School Funding Reparations in New Jersey. Trenton, NJ: New jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/separate-and-unequal-racial-and-ethnic-segregation-and-the-case-for-school-funding-reparations-in-new-jersey/

[2] Baker, B. D., & Weber, M. A. (2016). Beyond the echo-chamber: State investments and student outcomes in US elementary and secondary education. Journal of Education Finance, 42(1), 1–27.

Baker, B. D., Weber, M., & Srikanth, A. (2021). Informing Federal School Finance Policy with Empirical Evidence. Journal of Education Finance, 47(1), 1–25.

Jackson, C. K., Johnson, R. C., & Persico, C. (2016). The effects of school spending on educational and economic outcomes: Evidence from school finance reforms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(1), 157–218. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036

Jackson, K. (2018). Does School Spending Matter? (Working Paper 25368). National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w25368

Lafortune, J., & Schönholzer, D. (2022). The Impact of School Facility Investments on Students and Homeowners: Evidence from Los Angeles. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 14(3), 254–289. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200467

Rothstein, J., & Schanzenbach, D. W. (2021). Does Money Still Matter? Attainment and Earnings Effects of Post-1990 School Finance Reforms. 48.

[3] Baker, B. D. (2017). How Money Matters for Schools. Learning Policy Institute. https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/product/how-money-matters-report

Jackson, C. K., Johnson, R. C., & Persico, C. (2016). The effects of school spending on educational and economic outcomes: Evidence from school finance reforms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(1), 157–218. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036

Finn, J. D., & Achilles, C. M. (1999). Tennessee’s Class Size Study: Findings, Implications, Misconceptions. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 21(2), 97–109.

[4] Abbott decisions, a series of cases before the state Supreme Court that mandated that the Legislature increase funding to a select group of high-needs districts; https://edlawcenter.org/litigation/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html

[5] Baker, B. D. and Weber, M.A. (2022) New Jersey School Funding: The Higher the Goals, the Higher the Costs. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/new-jersey-school-funding-the-higher-the-goals-the-higher-the-costs/

[6] Abbott XXI, 206 N.J. 332 (May 2011)

[7] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2020) New Jersey’s School Funding Reform Act at 10 Years. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Policy Perspective. http://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NJPP-Bruce-Baker-School-Funding-Reform-Act-at-10-Years-Full-Report.pdf

[8] Baker, B. D. and Weber, M.A. (2022) New Jersey School Funding: The Higher the Goals, the Higher the Costs. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/new-jersey-school-funding-the-higher-the-goals-the-higher-the-costs/

[9] Baker, B. D. and Weber, M.A. (2022) New Jersey School Funding: The Higher the Goals, the Higher the Costs. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/new-jersey-school-funding-the-higher-the-goals-the-higher-the-costs/

[10] https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/

[11] New Jersey Assessment of Skills and Knowledge.

[12] The Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers.

[13] New Jersey Student Learning Assessments.

[14] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2020) New Jersey’s School Funding Reform Act at 10 Years. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Policy Perspective. http://www.njpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NJPP-Bruce-Baker-School-Funding-Reform-Act-at-10-Years-Full-Report.pdf

[15] Taylor, L., Willis, J., Berg-Jacobson, A., Jaquet, K., & Caparas, R. (2018). Estimating the costs associated with reaching student achievement expectations for Kansas public education students: A cost function approach. San Francisco, CA: WestEd. Retrieved from https://probstforprogress.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/kansas_adequacy_study_cost_function_approach_20180315_final.pdf

Duncombe, W., Yinger, J. (2006) Estimating the Costs of Meeting Student Performance Outcomes Adopted by the Kansas State Board of Education. Prepared for the Kansas Legislative Division of Post Audit  https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/cpr/research/cpr_research_education_finance_policy/Kansas_Report.pdf

[16] Kolbe, T., Baker, B.D., Atchison, D., Levin, J. (2019) Pupil Weighting Factors Report. State of Vermont, House and Senate Committees on Education. https://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Legislative-Reports/edu-legislative-report-pupil-weighting-factors-2019.pdf

See also: https://www.wcax.com/2022/05/24/vermont-per-pupil-spending-reform-bill-signed-into-law/

[17] Baker, B.D., Atchison, D., Levin, J., Kearns, C. (2020) New Hampshire Commission to Study School Funding, Final Report: https://carsey.unh.edu/sites/default/files/media/2020/09/20-12685_nh_final_report_version_v5_draft_1.pdf

[18] Baker, B.D., Di Carlo, M., Weber, M. (2022) Ensuring Adequate Education Funding for All: A New Federal Foundation Aid Formula. Albert Shanker Institute: https://www.shankerinstitute.org/fedformula

Baker, B.D., Di Carlo, M., Weber, M. (2021) The Adequacy of School District Spending in the U.S. Albert Shanker Institute. https://www.schoolfinancedata.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/SFID_DCDbrief_Mar2021.pdf

[19] Baker, B.D. and Weber, M.A. (2022). School Funding in New Jersey: A Fair Future for All. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Policy Perspective. https://www.njpp.org/publications/report/school-funding-in-new-jersey-a-fair-future-for-all/

[20] Baker, B.D., Di Carlo, M., Weber, M. (2022) Ensuring Adequate Education Funding for All: A New Federal Foundation Aid Formula. Albert Shanker Institute: https://www.shankerinstitute.org/fedformula

Baker, B.D., Di Carlo, M., Weber, M. (2021) The Adequacy of School District Spending in the U.S. Albert Shanker Institute. https://www.schoolfinancedata.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/SFID_DCDbrief_Mar2021.pdf